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Abstract 
This thesis aims to reproduce the study Esping-Andersen conducted in the seminal 
work “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990) in a 21st century context. 
The study conducted in “Three Worlds” discovered that welfare states tended to 
cluster around three welfare-state regimes: social democratic, conservative and 
liberal. The purpose is to see whether the studied countries have changed during 
the first decade of the new millennium and whether the three-folded typology is 
still valid. 
The study conducted departs from the theoretical concepts de-
commodification and stratification, which according to Esping-Andersen, defines 
a welfare-state regime. The concepts are studied in a quantitative comparative 
analysis of eighteen OECD countries, of the years 2000 and 2010 to see whether 
there are any changes during the 21
st
 century. 
The study discovers that there are still evidence of a clustering around the 
three ideal-types social democratic, conservative and liberal welfare-state regimes. 
In comparison to Esping-Andersen’s study, there is even a greater coherence 
between the concepts de-commodification and stratification, where more 
countries in 2000 adheres to the same typology on both axis than in the original 
study, and even more in 2010. 
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1 Introduction 
The welfare state represents a structure of a modern society. Every country that 
has experienced economic growth tends to develop a welfare state, no matter what 
political climate or ideology that is the country’s basis. Welfares states do 
however vary between countries to a large degree in how the welfare state is 
structured and which effects it has got on the society (Wilensky 1975, p.86). 
Today, the reformation of the welfare state is on the agenda, where its 
development is highly demanded (Pierson 2007, p.1). The reformation is stated as 
crucial in a time of globalization, changing need of the population, demographic 
changes etc. (Schwartz 2001). The welfare state has undergone enormous 
transformations since the beginning of the 20
th
 century of what can almost be 
called revolutionary (Heclo 1974, p.2). The welfare state experienced the largest 
economic growth during the postwar period. However, the story of the welfare 
state is not just a success story and the first economical strain occurred during the 
1970’s where cuts were made, and has continued so over the past decades in 
periods (Hacker 2006, p.385). One of the most prominent ideas in welfare state 
cuts is privatization. Privatization has been seen as the driving force of eroding the 
welfare state (Hacker 2006, p.396). In addition, there is a prevailing debate on the 
ideological climate, that liberal ideas have taken over the past century’s social 
democratic concept of what a welfare state should be, leading to the dismantling 
or retrenchment of the welfare state – debating the being of the welfare state. 
There are claims that there has been a political climate change in the world, 
leaning towards the conservative ideology, compared with the earlier social 
democratic welfare state model (cf. Pierson 1996/2006, p.348). While some 
consider the welfare state as in a crisis, others argue that the policy framework of 
the western welfare states is considered as consistent due to path dependency or 
the power resources (cf. Pierson 2000).  
The welfare state as a phenomenon is debated both in its development, current 
status and form. In 1990, Gösta Esping-Andersen released his work “The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” that illustrated that there are three types of welfare 
states in the capitalist world: social democratic, liberal and conservative welfare-
state regimes. What Esping-Andersen did that was so unique was to illustrate that 
the empirical world of welfare states was actually clustering into these different 
theoretical typologies and not acknowledging welfare states as unique cases. This 
work launched a debate that lasted for a decade or even more on whether there are 
ideal-typical welfare states and whether they cluster together or not. “Three 
Worlds” was heavily criticized, but also acclaimed as it offered an analytical tool 
in welfare state research that is used even today, and is now considered a modern 
classic (Arts and Gelissen 2002, pp.138-139).  
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Even though “Three Worlds” was released in 1990, and the study was based 
on 1980’s data, the three-folded typology is still used today. Therefore, there is 
need to see whether these typologies are still valid in a 21
st
 century context. 
Moreover, some researcher consider the modern welfare state as in a crisis, 
needing to meet the challenges of a globalized world (cf. Schwartz 2001), while 
others consider the welfare state a stable phenomenon in a modern state (cf. 
Pierson 2000). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate if the welfare state in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century is in a state of development or whether it stands to 
last. 
This thesis is thus two-folded in its purpose: to investigate welfare state 
changes during the first decade of the 21
st
 century, and to test the theory 
developed by Esping-Andersen in “Three Worlds”. Therefore, the relevance of the 
study is also two-folded. First, as the typology of three welfare-state regimes is 
used today as an analytical tool, even though it might be outdated, it is important 
to replicate the study and see whether welfare states still tend to cluster 
accordingly. Second, as the present and future state of welfare states is so debated, 
it is interesting to investigate whether there has been a change in the de-
commodification and stratification level at the studied countries during the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century. As there has been many reproductions on “Three 
Worlds”; of which most was conducted on the same year (study conducted 1990, 
on 1980’s data), there is no need to test the theory on its own merits during that 
period of time. However, there are fewer reproduction studies that have been 
conducted during the 21
st
 century, even less that compares the development over 
time, and even so less that combine a study of both concepts stratification and de-
commodification. Therefore, the relevance of the study lies in all the above: its 
theory testing, the comparison between year 2000 and 2010 and lastly, that both 
defining concepts of a welfare-state regime are studied together. The relevance 
and focus of the study is mostly theoretical, and it offers an empirical insight in 
welfare state development for eighteen OECD countries. 
The three-folded welfare-state typology developed by Esping-Andersen, is 
sometimes (spitefully) referred to as representing welfare’s “The Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly”, from the 1960’s Clint Eastwood movie. Which label that belongs 
to which regime is for the reader to decide, but the question arises: Do welfare-
state regimes still consist of ‘the Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Can welfare states 
today really be categorized into the three welfare-state regimes that were 
discovered thirty years ago? 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this thesis is to reproduce the study conducted by Esping-
Andersen in his seminal work “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990) in 
order to see whether there are still three clusters of welfare-state regimes in the 
capitalist countries or whether the welfare regime climate has shifted since the 
1980’s (data in “Three Worlds” was from 1980). Esping-Andersen developed a 
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definition of how welfare states are structured with the concepts de-
commodification and stratification. This definition of a welfare-state regime is 
used in this study as an indicator of how welfare states have developed during the 
21
st
 century and thus whether there still is a three-folded welfare-state regime 
clustering. The first two questions will be answered with the result, while the third 
question is a matter of discussion in the final chapter. The research questions for 
this study reads:  
 
 Today, is there still a cluster of three welfare-state regimes in the 18 
studied countries? 
 How, and in what respect have the welfare states internal structure 
changed over the last decade, using Esping-Andersen’s definition of a 
welfare-state regime? 
 Does the result support or falsify the three-folded typology, in a 21st 
century context?  
1.2 Method and Material 
To investigate welfare state development in the 21
st
 century, and compare with the 
findings Esping-Andersen made in “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (from 
now on referred to as “Three Worlds”) in 1990 on 1980’s data, this study will be 
conducted as a replication. Therefore, the studied countries are identical, the 
method and scoring metric as well. However, not all data that Esping-Andersen 
used is available, additional sources and thus operationalization will be used.  
The method used is quantitative in the respect that it is based on aggregated 
country data for the theoretical concepts described by Esping-Andersen: de-
commodification and stratification. De-commodification refers to the life 
standards provided by the welfare state for unemployed workers or workers 
outside the market, while stratification refers to which extent a welfare state 
redistribute assets between the societal strata (described in detail in chapter 2). 
Based on how the countries perform on the two welfare-state dimensions, they are 
categorized as belonging to either a socialist, liberal or conservative welfare-state 
regime. The data that is used for de-commodification is gathered from the 
Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED2, Scruggs et.al., 2013). The 
data for stratification is gathered from the OECD databases and “Social Security 
Programs throughout the World” (Social Security Administration, USA). 
In order to see whether welfare-state regimes have shifted during the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century, the study consists of a comparison between two 
time periods: year 2000 and 2010. This thesis will thus be designed as a cross-
temporal comparative welfare research study, using the definition of a welfare-
state regime made by Esping-Andersen in “The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism”, using the same countries, with an operationalization that differs to 
some extent. 
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1.3 Disposition 
This thesis will be introduced in this chapter (Chapter 1), to be followed by the 
theoretical framework, where previous research and Esping-Andersen’s “Three 
Worlds is presented (Chapter 2). After the theoretical framework, the 
methodological approach and discussions of doing a replica will be presented 
(Chapter 3). In chapter 4, the results of the de-commodification, stratification and 
the combined analysis is presented, followed by a discussion on the replication 
results (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 offers the executive summary, while tables and the 
variable oversight are found in the Appendix. 
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2 Welfare States and Welfare-State 
Regimes 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework which is used in this study. To do 
so, previous welfare state research is firstly presented, followed by a section on 
how to define the welfare state, to finally be followed by the theory used in this 
study: Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990). “Three 
Worlds” is a seminal work in comparative welfare state research that today is used 
as an analytical tool, while it still is a subject for debate. Due to the huge reactions 
this book created, the final section serves as a short literature review on the debate 
that followed “Three Worlds”.  
2.1 Welfare State Research 
Welfare state research is extensive, both in range of material but also in its variety 
of theoretical frameworks, resulting in a theoretically fragmented literature (Hicks 
1999, p.16). Welfare state research focused during most part of the 20
th
 century on 
welfare state origins and development, to nowadays focus more on welfare state 
retrenchment and the challenges the welfare state meet today.  
One of the first research fields on welfares state development focused on 
industrialism as the cause of welfare state growth, where “[…] industrialization 
creates new demands for public spending as systems of social support based on 
kinship and the patrimonial traditions of agrarian societies are eroded” (Myles & 
Quadagno 2002, p.36). Kerr et al. claims that it is industrialism, not capitalism, 
which has given rise to the new welfare state, but also to labor market problems. 
Primarily, industrialism and its new technology require high skilled labor, which 
in turn requires an educational system to meet the needs of industry, which is to 
be provided by government. Thus, the inherent nature of industrialism demands 
an equivalent change in the societal structure leading to the development of the 
welfare state (Kerr et al. 1960, p.239).  
During the 1970’s the “power resource theory”, formalized by Walter Korpi, 
became dominant, focusing on political parties and class-related factors in welfare 
state growth as causes for the emergence of different welfare states (Myles & 
Quadagno 2002, p.37-38). The power resource model is sprung from a Marxist-
Leninist theory of structural change as a result of class struggle, coming from the 
unequal distribution of power resources in society (Korpi 1983/2006, p.76). As 
the power resource distribution in society formed the welfare state, it also helps 
with its upholding (Lindbom 2011, p.21). The power resource theory can be seen 
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as response to the earlier dominant pluralist theory of an equally distributed power 
resource in society, and that change has come about due to organizations and 
groups acting on behalf of their collective interests. Power resources are described 
by Korpi as: “[…] characteristics which provide actors – individuals and 
collectives – with the ability to punish or reward other actors” (Korpi 1983/2006, 
p.76). Recent studies within the field of power resources have come to focus more 
on a population’s policy preferences and how nation states’ ideological legacies 
creates ideal-typical welfare regimes (Brooks & Manza 2006, p.817). The ideal 
typical welfare regimes were described by Gösta Esping-Andersen in 1990 where 
he attempts to categorize different western welfare states. He outlines a theory on 
how the development of welfare states in different countries is a result of their 
different political traditions and furthermore, how the degree of mobilization of 
workers, and thus the class-struggle between workers and elites, has influenced 
the formation of the welfare state. In countries such as the Scandinavian, where 
worker mobilization and social democratic party influence was greater than in the 
southern European, the welfare state is more extensive and generous (Esping-
Andersen 1990). 
Approaching the closing of the 20
th
 century, the focus of welfare state research 
was set on the crisis of the welfare state, which coincided with the fiscal crisis of 
the nation states during the 1990’s, demanding cut-backs in the welfare state 
spending. However, the first crisis of the welfare state started in the 1970’s where 
welfare states for the first time ceased to grow (Pierson 2007, p.143). The crisis of 
the welfare state also overlapped with an increased challenge of the primacy of 
the social democratic welfare state model, contesting whether a welfare state is 
the only way to reach social equity, where market based welfare was seen as the 
other solution. Also, there were ideas of the welfare state’s expiration date that 
rose both from neo-Marxists and the New Right (ibid). In addition, there was a 
paradigm shift in macroeconomics from the earlier so praised Keynesian model, 
which was highly related with the social democratic welfare state model, leaving 
room for the ideas of monetarism and supply-side economics (Hay 2001, p.204). 
The paradigm shift was a direct effect of the economic recession of the 1970’s and 
resulted in a fundamental critique on the welfare state (Offe 1982, p.67).  
At the turn into the new millennium, the welfare state appeared to have 
survived the crisis and research focus shifted towards the policy changes that 
occurred during the crisis (Palier 2003/2006, p.359). Contrary to what was 
thought, the policy analysis stated that the welfare state crisis did not result in a 
change in policy frameworks to the extent researchers thought and that it still 
represented the postwar welfare state model, contradicting the withdrawal of the 
welfare state (Hacker 2006, p.396). Equally, Pierson concludes in “Dismantling 
the Welfare State” (1994) that the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, which 
were seen as strong reformist of the welfare state in USA and Great Britain 
respectively, only changed the social programs to a limited level. Although there 
was retrenchment, as some social programs were cut more than others, e.g. 
housing programs and unemployment benefits (Pierson 1994, pp.4-5).  
The dominating theoretical field in explaining welfare state persistence during 
its period of crisis is “path dependence”. Besides the power resource theory, the 
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theory of path dependence was also one of the most dominant in explaining 
welfare state trends in recent research (Brooks & Manza 2006, p.817). The 
theoretical field rejects the notion of an extensive welfare state retrenchment as 
political institutions are highly path dependent. As the founder of the theoretical 
concept, Pierson describes welfare state persistence as sprung from the difficulty 
of changing a political trajectory; the further one steps down a political pathway, 
the harder it gets to change to another policy; where the cost of exit is too high 
(Pierson 2000, p.252). Established institutions are thus difficult to change as 
individuals and organizations adapt their behavior to the institution (North in 
Pierson 2000, p.256). The reason given for the persistence of the welfare state is 
thus the expectations set on a nation’s welfare provision, making it difficult to 
shift policy areas even though the political will might be there (Hacker 2006, 
p.396). 
The reform of the welfare state is a current theme in welfare state research but 
also a matter on the political agenda as it is stated that the welfare state cannot 
survive in its present state (Pierson 2007, p.1). As the welfare state seems to be 
quite consistent in the contemporary society, the research today has thus moved 
towards trying to explain how the welfare state can survive and adapt to its future 
challenges. In the current research there is a consistent view of “then” and “now”; 
illustrating a breaking point of the welfare state (cf. Hay 2001, p.201). Today, the 
welfare state is seen as meeting an outer challenge and its survival is dependent 
upon how these challenges are met. Schwartz sums up the challenges in what he 
call the “usual suspects”; globalization, demographic change and domestic politics 
(Schwartz 2001, pp.17-20).  
2.2 Defining the Welfare State 
When investigating a phenomenon such as the welfare state, it is important to 
define the concept. The most common way to define a welfare state is through its 
expenditures, as a percentage of a nation’s GDP, and in relation to other countries 
level of spending. Yet, this is not a satisfying definition since it does not say 
anything of what a welfare state actually is and is consequently “theoretically 
epiphenomenal”. It also assumes that “all spending counts equally” no matter on 
what the money is spent on, may it be civil servant wages or social security 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p.19). Therefore, alternative definitions are desirable. 
The minimum definition of a welfare state can be stated as the responsibility of a 
state to secure a minimum level of welfare towards its citizens. Though, what a 
minimum level of welfare actually means could be debated (Esping-Andersen 
1990, pp.18-19). Correspondingly, Briggs define the welfare state as: “A welfare 
state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics 
and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least 
three directions […] guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income 
[…] social contingencies […][and] social services” (Briggs, 1961/2006, p.16). 
Wilensky and Lebeaux concurs with the notion that the essence of the welfare 
  8 
state is “[…] government protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, 
health, housing, and education for every citizen, assured to him as a political 
right, not as charity” - and that both critics and welfare state enthusiasts can agree 
upon this remark (Wilensky & Lebeaux 1975:xii). Moreover, they recognize the 
two features that define public policy: redistribution of income and equality of 
opportunity of the young (ibid), which can be compared with Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) definition of the state: the state as a system of stratification and de-
commodification of workers which is used in this study (see below). 
The typologies and theoretical background to Esping-Andersen’s study was 
influenced by two giants in welfare state research: Marshall and Titmuss (Arts & 
Gelissen 2002, p.138). Marshall describes “social citizenship” as the main concept 
of a welfare state. Citizenship is in turn divided into three parts: the civil, political 
and social. The civil part denotes the individual’s right to liberty and freedom of 
speech, thought and property, the political part denotes the right to participate in 
the exercise of political power, while the social part refers to the right to lead a 
civilized life according to the social standards of society. Thus, the three parts of 
citizenship is provided by the government through institutions such as the law, 
educational system and social services (Marshall 1950/2006, p.30).  
One of the most influential research contributions to the field of welfare states 
and one of the first to use typologies in the field is Titmuss. In his “Essays on the 
Welfare State” (1958) Titmuss divides the welfare state into either residual or 
insutitional. Residual states are the welfare states that only provide welfare when 
the family or market fails to do so, while the institutional welfare states are 
universal, covering the entire population (Titmuss in Esping-Andersen 1990, 
p.20). 
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Welfare-state Regimes 
“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990) by Esping-Andersen is one of 
the most influential writings on welfare states, representing a scholarly field that 
seeks to investigate the historical origins of why welfare states are so different in 
both spending and social policy. In “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, 
Esping-Andersen “re-specifies the welfare state” using the concept of welfare-
state regimes. In this sense he avoids what he calls a narrow concept: “[…] the 
concept of the welfare state is to narrowly associated with the conventional 
social-amelioration policies” (1990, p.2). But also, as he continues: 
“…contemporary advanced countries cluster not only in terms of how their 
traditional social-welfare policies are constructed, but also in terms of how these 
influence employment and general social structure” (ibid.). Thus, when talking of 
a welfare-state regime instead of a welfare state, it broadens the concept when 
taking to account that the nation state’s legal and organizational features and the 
welfare state are interwoven (ibid). This is in much line with how Hacker 
describes the welfares state, where he denotes that a major part of what welfare 
states are today is within the field of social policy. The welfare state is however 
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not just one major political institution, it is also shaped according to the structure 
of the nation state, leading it to be a good basis of analysis of government 
decision-making (Hacker 2006, p.386). 
Esping-Andersen describes the three pillars of welfare provision in his 
development of a theoretical framework: the market, the family and government. 
Different welfare regimes emphasize different pillars and it is the interaction of 
these pillars that define different welfare-state regimes. Where a social democratic 
welfare regime emphasizes welfare provided by the government, a liberal stresses 
the importance of the market, while the conservative focuses on family provision 
(Esping-Andersen 2002, pp.11-13). However, there are no pure ideal typical 
welfare states, but all states have an inherent mixture of welfare provision systems 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p.49). One reason for the mixed welfare state systems is 
that welfare state construction was dependent on coalition building (ibid., p.30).  
In “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” Esping-Andersen made an empirical 
inquiry of sixteen capitalist countries in order to establish a typology consisting of 
the different welfare states. The study showed a pattern of three clusters of 
welfare states; which were named social democratic, liberal and conservative 
welfare states due to the ideological background of the states. States that were 
considered as Social democratic are: Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden, whereas the liberal states are: Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and 
the United States, the conservative states are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany 
and Italy. States that showed ambiguous results were: Ireland, New Zealand and 
United Kingdom.  
Esping-Andersen stresses the importance of defining the state structure in 
order to find out the nature of welfare states (1990, p.20). In “The Three Worlds” 
welfare-state regimes are defined as a combination of the two concepts de-
commodification and stratification. As stated above, “Three Worlds” is belonging 
to the field of power resource theory, which derives from a Marxist way of 
looking at the welfare state, which is worth noting and is visible in the way 
welfare state regimes are defined. De-commodification and stratification will be 
described in detail in the following two sections. 
2.3.1 De-commodification 
 
De-commodification is a term sprung from the workers position in society. 
Industrialism and capitalism brought about a change in the labor market, where 
workers now were seen as commodities and “[…] their survival was contingent 
upon the sale of their labor power” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.21).  
In opposition to the market, the state is considered as the “de-commodifier” as 
it introduces social rights and lets individuals lead their lives without relying 
entirely on the market (ibid., pp.21-22). The definition of de-commodification is: 
“[…] that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general 
welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary” (ibid., p.23). 
Though, the concept de-commodification is not a method of liberating workers 
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from market dependence, but a way of measuring to which degree workers can 
lead a decent life off the market and still have access to welfare (ibid., p.37). 
Esping-Andersen describes (inspired by Polanyi, 1994) the evolution of the 
welfare state as a reaction to and the mobilization of the working class against the 
commodification of workers. The workers could not participate in a collective 
action, such as demonstrations, without a certain level of de-commodification 
(ibid., p.37).  
The liberal welfare states share the characteristic of having means-tested 
social benefits in a larger extent than other states (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.26). 
Means-tested benefits are a selective social policy which is oriented only towards 
those who have economic needs, excluding the middle-class, as opposed to the 
universal benefit system (Rothstein 2010, pp.30-32). The benefit system of a 
liberal state is based on the idea that benefits should not change an individual’s 
incentives to work, i.e. preferring work over benefits, thus leading to a modest 
compensation level. By only guaranteeing a minimum level of benefits, liberal 
welfare states only secures a minimum level of de-commodification (Esping-
Andersen 1990, p.26-27). The archetypical liberal welfare states are Australia, 
Canada and the United States.  
In the second cluster of welfare states, one can find countries such as Austria, 
France, Germany and Italy. These are labeled the conservative welfare states, 
which are made up by corporatist and etatist countries (ibid., p.27). Etatism 
focuses on state primacy (ibid, p.59) while the corporatist welfare states “[…] 
springs from the tradition of the estates, guilds, monopolies, and corporations that 
organized social and economic life in the medieval city economy” and still 
influences society in these welfare-state regimes (ibid, p.60). The corporatist 
welfare states demonstrate a system where the market is not seen as the provider 
of welfare, as in the liberal states, but the family. In addition, the corporatist 
welfare states are structurally influenced by the Church which is evident in the 
pursuit for family provided welfare. The corporatist countries shows little or no 
redistributive effects as it ascribes social rights to class and aims to preserve the 
traditional family and societal strata. This is evident in the welfare provision 
system where welfare only takes over where the family no longer can provide, e.g. 
benefits favors mothers and day-care is underdeveloped (ibid., p.27). The 
corporatist welfare states still ensure a certain level of de-commodification as 
there are benefits to those in need. Although, due to the way the system is built, 
where benefits are based on contributions of those in the labor force, market 
dependence is still prevalent, although not as much as in the liberal welfare states 
(ibid., p.22). 
The third welfare-regime cluster represents the countries with the highest level 
of de-commodification. The countries found in this cluster typically consist of the 
Scandinavian or north European countries. This cluster of welfare-state regimes is 
called the social democratic, due to the long tradition of social democratic rule 
during the 20
th
 century and thus during the development of the welfare state. What 
distinguishes the social democratic regime cluster from the liberal and the 
corporatist is the universal benefit system. The universal benefit system not only 
benefits low-income earners, but also the middle-class. Moreover, benefits are set 
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to secure a certain living standard, not only as to meet the minimum need, with 
benefits adjusted to the accustomed earnings. The social democratic model 
isolates workers from market dependence to a certain extent, leading all citizens 
to be dependent on the model and thus feel obliged to pay (ibid., pp.27-28). 
2.3.2 Stratification 
The other defining concept of a welfare-state regime is stratification. The concept 
stratification refers to the welfare state as a “system of stratification”, which in 
turn refers to the redistributive characteristics of the welfare state. The welfare 
state is seen as an actor, intervening in the ordering of social relations and 
inequality (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.23). Stratification is described as the core of 
the welfare state, something that has always been and always will be no matter 
which additional social policy services that may be provided. Different welfare 
systems affects the stratification of society in different ways, either to a more 
egalitarian level, or by cementing class-structures (ibid., p.55). The welfare state 
has different means of stratifying, but the most well-known is income 
redistribution. Today, social transfers play the biggest role in income 
redistribution where it yesterday was the tax system. Despite that almost all 
welfare states have a system of income redistribution, the outcome varies 
significantly: where the redistributive effect in the Scandinavian countries is great, 
it is much smaller in countries such as Germany and France. Why different 
welfare states creates different redistributive outcomes is however largely left 
unexplained (ibid., p.56). The welfare state affects the societal stratification in 
more ways than just income redistribution: social policy such as the educational 
system and social services affects in a great deal, especially for women (ibid., 
p.58).  
There are three measures for welfare-state regime stratification: conservative, 
liberal and social democratic. For the conservative welfare-state regimes, the 
traditional societal class model is a prevalent idea, but also the rejection of 
capitalism. Which leaves conservatism between the market based ideology of 
liberalism and the social democratic wish for social leveling (ibid., p.58).  Esping-
Andersen distinguishes between two branches of conservatism: corporatism and 
etatism. Corporatism is described as a response to industrialism and its effects: 
social fragmentation and individualization. In modern societies, corporatism is 
described as “…built around occupational groupings seeking to uphold 
traditionally recognized status distinctions and use these as the organizational 
nexus for society and economy” (ibid., p.60). Corporatism was mostly influential 
in the continental European nations, as a response to the Church’s strong position 
(ibid., p.61). Etatism, on the other hand, focuses on the primacy of the state. 
Esping-Andersen illustrates etatism with Bismarck’s wish to tie workers directly 
to the state with social benefits, instead of tying workers to the guilds, as in the 
corporatist model. Today, etatism can be traced in two areas of welfare state 
stratification, where one is giving generous welfare provision to civil servants, 
giving state servants an elevated position in society, as in countries such as 
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Austria, Germany and France. The other area where etatism can be noted today is 
the relatively generous poor-relief or income protection, based on the idea of 
noblesse oblige (ibid., pp.59-60). 
The liberal response to the conservative ideas of etatism was the opposite. The 
state and the stratified society were seen as something that had gotten in the way 
of market emancipation, and in extension, individual liberty. Social policy were to 
be replaced by the market in order to achieve social leveling, not to eliminate aid, 
but to have a less active state (ibid., pp.61-62). Today, liberalism does accept 
income-tested social benefits, although it is associated with social stigma to be a 
social assistance beneficiary. Due to the core liberal idea of the smallest state 
possible, benefits are usually means-tested and modest, given only to those that 
are genuinely poor, creating the stigma. The liberal welfare-state system is based 
on the notion that those who are entrepreneurial and self-reliant should be 
rewarded. Social insurances exists, but they are privately held and paid for (ibid., 
pp.62-64).  
The socialist movement started as a response both to conservative and liberal 
reforms. The most important notion of socialism was to change the societal 
stratification and achieve social leveling. The primary target was to change the 
means-tested poor laws since they created a stigma within the proletariat and that 
beneficiaries were disenfranchised (ibid., p.65). The social democratic idea of 
universal benefit system as a prolongation of democratic rights was most evident 
in the Scandinavian countries and particularly in the Swedish “People’s home” 
(ibid., p.67). The universal benefit system came to include even the middle-class 
in order to “preserve the solidarity of a universalistic welfare state” (ibid., p.69). 
A universal benefit system denotes a system where social aid is for everyone. This 
picture is somewhat simplified, although benefits are universal in general, and 
more general than the means-tested system where only a limited group qualifies 
for benefits (cf. Rothstein 2010, p.30ff). Moreover, the socialist movement 
focused on the concept of solidarity and in extension, one of its most distinctive 
features: centralized bargaining trough trade unions (ibid., p.66).   
2.4 Literature review: reactions on “Three Worlds” 
“Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990) got widespread 
attention when it was released due to the welfare-state regime clustering it 
illustrated. What was new, besides the clustering, was how welfare states, or 
welfare-state regimes, were defined: on a de-commodification and a stratification 
axis. There were strong reactions to “Three Worlds”, critique and praises, where 
the following decade (or more) of welfare state research was a response to and 
followed in its footsteps trying to test the theoretical and methodological bearings 
of this study (cf. Edwards 2003, pp.3-5). Arts and Gelissen refers to the critique as 
constructive or negative: the constructive criticism acknowledges the typology 
although not as an exhaustive nor exclusive one, while the negative is more 
hostile, referring to shortcomings in method and theory (2002, p.138). “Three 
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Worlds” also inspired others to engage in categorizing welfare states according to 
ideal-types, e.g. Leibfried 1992, Castles & Mitchell 1993, Siaroff 1994, Ferrera 
1996. As there were such reactions to “Three Worlds”, there is a vast range of 
research conducted, and it is thus close to impossible to get a full literature 
overview, in this forum at least. However, this section will provide a brief 
literature review on the debate, due to the vast range of material, departing from 
the four most occurring debates: the feminist rejection of Esping-Andersen’s 
typologies, the methodological debate and whether there are only three ideal-
types. 
The research tradition that has been the most critical towards the “The Three 
Worlds” is feminist scholars (Edwards 2003, p.2). According to Hacker, gender 
has long been a neglected study area within the field of social policy. This is 
stated as rather surprising when considering that women are main beneficiaries of 
family assistant programs, but also that social policy changes often are largely 
influenced by female reform leaders (Hacker 2006, p.389). The criticism is mostly 
based on the fact that the analysis by Esping-Andersen totally misses vital parts 
within the field of social policy when constructing his analysis. The gender based 
critique against “Three Worlds” is connected with the concept of de-
commodification and family provision in welfare (Arts & Gelissen 2002). Shortly 
after “Three Worlds” was released, there was demand that the concept of welfare 
state regimes needed to incorporate both paid and unpaid domestic work in order 
to capture the full extent to which a welfare state is de-commodifying (Lewis 
1992, Orloff 1993). When incorporating gender into the analysis, the clustering of 
countries emerges in a totally different manner (Edwards 2003, p.6). There was 
such a large extent of gender based arguments that Esping-Andersen felt the need 
to revise his arguments (1999). He states that de-commodification as used in 
“Three Worlds” is a concept that does derive from paid work and that women 
increasingly are becoming part of the welfare state de-commodification as more 
are entering the labor force. However, there are still a large portion of men and 
women that are “pre-commodified” and relying on family provision. Esping-
Andersen thus re-conceptualizes de-commodifcation to “de-familialization”, 
although he in “Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies” examines and 
illustrates that the variations for these two concepts are the same within welfare 
states (1999, p.45).  
The methodological debate covers almost all aspects of the study in “Three 
Worlds” are the reproductions and thus opinions are many. There has been some 
critique that the de-commodification index is predesigned as it only intended to 
show high/medium/low scorers that are social democratic/conservative/liberal and 
even if there were a fourth or fifth regime type, the study would not show it 
(Bambra 2006). The scoring metric for the de-commodification index (see 
following chapter for details on the scoring) is said to be overstating the 
importance of replacement rates, as their score is doubled within the index 
(Bambra 2006). Esping-Andersen explains this methodological choice as a 
deliberate way to emphasize the importance of replacement rates in relation to 
work-welfare choices and in relation to the other variables (Esping-Andersen 
1990, p.54).  
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Moreover, the scores for the three investigated social insurances are weighted 
with respective insurance coverage rates. Bambra criticizes this methodological 
choice as it gives coverage rates a too important role in the de-commodification 
index, favoring countries with a high coverage rate and low de-commofication 
scores and disfavoring countries with high scores and a low coverage rates (2006). 
Esping-Andersen explains the choice of weighting the de-commodification scores 
with the coverage rates as: “A program may very well offer luxurious benefits and 
liberal conditions, but if it addresses solely a small clientele, it has obviously a 
limited capacity to de-commodify” (1990, p.49).  
The third most occurring methodological critique is the choice of giving 
Australia a coverage rate of 50% as the country’s social security system is means-
testing. The critique lies mainly in that the share of 50 % is arbitrarily chosen and 
that it affects Australia’s de-commodification index negatively, leaving it with a 
lower score than it should have had otherwise (Bambra 2006, Scruggs and Allan 
2006). Australia is stated as to have the largest means-tested public benefit 
system, with an inclusive approach, leaving the majority of the population with 
social protection, relying more on income redistribution than social protection. 
Also, New Zealand’s welfare state is based on a similar model. Therefore the 
conclusion is drawn that the Antipodes should have its own typology (Castles in 
Arts & Gelissen 2002, p.146). Esping-Andersen meets the critique with stating 
that Australia and New Zealand may have social programs with origins that 
resembles to a social democratic welfare state. But as the social programs are 
means-tested and welfare than relies to a certain extent on market provision, the 
liberal welfare-state regime is still the most appropriate one for the Antipodes 
(Esping-Andersen 1999, p.89). However, he does not address the “negative” 
scoring of Australian and New Zealand’s coverage rates. 
Another debate about changing the three worlds of welfare capitalism, to four, 
is regarding the Mediterranean countries. In “Three Worlds” there was only one 
Mediterranean country included, Italy. This has given rise to criticism as the 
Mediterranean countries are assumed share similar welfare state features. By not 
including Spain, Greece and Portugal, the Mediterranean features are disregarded, 
and thus another typology, clumping Italy and the other Mediterranean countries 
into a subgroup to the continental corporatist type. Esping-Andersen mentions 
these shared features by the Mediterranean countries in “Three Worlds”, the 
catholic and familialistic background, but develops this exclusion of these 
countries no further in “Three Worlds” (Arts & Gelissen 2002). However, this 
critique is addressed by Esping-Andersen in “Social Foundations of Postindustrial 
Societies” (1999), where Leibfried’s (1992) adjusted typology is discussed. 
Esping-Andersen does discard the notion that there should be a separate 
Mediterranean regime type due to the fact that the difference lies mainly in social 
assistance and that different social assistance does not qualify for a new idel-
typical regime type (1999, p.90). 
This section has shortly addressed the most common criticisms against “Three 
Worlds”. There is no doubt that the critique has got merits. The heaviest critique 
lies on the construction of a three folded typology and the study it is predesigned 
to fit the typology. Esping-Andersen argues against this as the typology is derived 
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from political theory, with the classical triad “conservative, liberal and social 
democratic”, as the basis of the analysis: representing the ideologies from which 
welfare states emerged (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.74). Moreover, the study is 
conducted for welfare-state regimes and not welfare states, where regimes denote 
the way “welfare production is allocated between state, market, and households” 
(Esping-Andersen 1999, p.73) and thus represents an ideal-type and not a “real 
type” (Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, p.584).  
Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser concluded in their meta-study on “Three Worlds” 
reproductions that the typologies are quite robust (reproductions conducted on the 
same period of time as “Three Worlds”). They are considered as robust as all 
countries belongs to the same typology in 50 percent (or more) of the cases. 
Moreover, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and USA are 
considered as “pure cases” as they almost consistently belong to the same cluster. 
Sweden and USA are the countries that are social democratic respectively liberal 
in every analysis (Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011).  
Kasza on the other hand argues that there is an illusion in contemporary 
welfare state research that welfare regimes do exist and that: “[…] few national 
welfare systems are likely to exhibit the internal consistency necessary to validate 
the regime concept, and that policy-specific comparisons may be a more 
promising avenue for comparative research” (Kasza 2002). It is thus a question 
on whether one accepts the theoretical basis for analyzing the empirical world of 
welfare-state regimes or not and whether ideal-types are accepted. 
Research today has somewhat accepted that there are different welfare 
regimes, though focusing more on programmatic regimes, e.g. pension regimes, or 
welfare regimes at the local level. The three folded typology today represents a 
strong analytical tool (Rice 2013, p.94). The typology thus still stands even 
though the vast range of reproduction and critique. “Three Worlds” is now 
considered a modern classic, or at least a seminal work in welfare state research. 
Whether one accepts the typology as a true picture of “the worlds of welfare 
capitalism” or not, it is still a useful analytical tool in comparative welfare 
research. 
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3 Methodological approach 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the current welfare state regimes in 18 
capitalist countries, following the study by Esping-Andersen in “The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990). In order to answer the research questions, 
the definition of a welfare regime made by Esping-Andersen will be used, 
consisting of the two dimensions de-commodification and stratification. 
Moreover, the methodology used by Esping-Andersen will be used. However, the 
same variables and data used in 1980-1990 are difficult to gather for the 21
st
 
century as the databases used are no longer available or variables have stopped 
being produced, which means that there will be a discrepancy between this study 
and the previous worth noting. This study aims to use variables as close as 
possible to Esping-Andersen’s in order to be able to compare the findings with his 
results. The studied countries will be the same as in “The Three Worlds” (1990).  
Besides from reproducing the study in “The Three Worlds” once, I will choose 
two years in the first decade of the 21
st
 century: 2000 and 2010. The reason for 
choosing two years is to be able to use the first year as a comparison for the 
second and whether the countries have shifted cluster and/or positions on a scale, 
or whether the clusters are fixed. In extension, to see whether the welfare states 
have changed their inter-relational position and thus whether this possibly could 
illustrate an interesting change in the western welfare states.  
This thesis will thus be designed as a cross-temporal comparative welfare 
research study, using the definition of a welfare state made by Esping-Andersen in 
“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” and using the same countries as in 
“The Three Worlds”, although with a different operationalization as the same data 
is difficult to gather from all countries. 
3.1 Research Design 
3.1.1 Theoretical Approach 
A study can either be theory testing or theory developing (George & Bennett 
2005, p.73). The problem with a theory testing study is when a theory does not 
explain the chosen cases, does it then depend on the inherent structure of the 
theory or the lack of applicability on the specific case (cf. George & Bennett 
2005, pp.115-116)? Moreover, theory testing is problematic as existing theories 
usually lack clarity and consistency which makes testing difficult as it seldom 
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could be done in the same way twice (George & Bennett 2005, p.182). In this 
study, testing will be as close as possible as the original although one cannot 
exclude the fact that there are discrepancies as the data is collected differently 
with respect to “Three Worlds”. To avoid a bias, this study aims to have an 
operationalization similar to those made by Esping-Andersen (1990) as is where 
the methodological chain differs between this study and his. However, it is 
important to notice the problems that might arise when aiming to compare two 
different studies if operationalization is diverge to a great extent. When 
reproducing a study that is not a total reproduction as it is in this case, it is 
important to be clear with what might be expected of the results and where the 
studies’ methodology differs. This study and Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds” 
differs in operationalization to some extent in de-commodification and to a greater 
extent in stratification, this will however be explained in detail below. 
By choosing a comparative approach on a plurality of cases, Esping-Andersen 
seeks to illustrate that there are more than one type of welfare state, or the concept 
used by him, welfare-state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.3). A comparative 
research design is one that resembles a scientific experiment in the fact that it uses 
a controlled comparison to draw conclusions on causality (George & Bennett 
2005, p.151). However, when aiming to develop a theory on clusters of welfare 
states, within-case analysis can be used in cross-case comparison without aiming 
to draw causal conclusions, being an alternative to controlled comparisons. 
Within-case analysis thus “establishes the value of the independent and dependent 
variables in the case at hand, and then compares the observed value of the 
dependent variable with that predicted by the theory, given the observed 
independent variable” in order to establish a possible causal relationship (ibid., 
p.179). Within-case analysis can be combined with a typological theory in order 
to make cross-case comparisons (ibid., p.234), as is done by Esping-Andersen 
(1990) and reproduced in this study. George and Bennett define a typological 
theory as:  
 
[…] a theory that specifies independent variables, delineates them into the 
categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their outcomes, and 
provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate individually, but also 
contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they behave in 
specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified dependent 
variables. (2005, p.235). 
This definition of a typological theory is consistent with the investigation med 
in “The Three Worlds”, but also in this study as I test the theory of the three 
welfare state clusters (dependent variable) which are measured as the level of de-
commodification and stratification (independent variables).  
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3.1.2 Case selection 
When research is theory testing, the choice of cases is a central feature in any 
study’s success; whether they represent crucial, most-likely or least-likely cases 
(George & Bennett 2005, p.75). The chosen cases for this study are the same 
countries as Esping-Andersen included in “The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism” (1990). He never fully explains the choice of cases more than 
describing them as “capitalist” welfare states (1990). However, it is quite clear 
that the chosen countries are representing a typical case of developed (capitalist) 
nations with a developed welfare state.  
The reason for choosing the same cases in this study as in “Three Worlds” is 
to have a research design as close as possible to the original, to be able to see 
whether the clustering that Esping-Andersen found is the same today as it was 
twenty years ago. Therefore, the case selection in the present study represents 
most-likely cases in order to validate or reject the theory developed by Esping-
Andersen in a contemporary context. If as study is designed as using most-likely 
cases and still does not validate the theory, it is seen as crucial evidence in 
weakening the theory (George & Bennett 2005, p.121), which in this case is used 
in order to see whether the theory is still valid. 
The countries used in Esping-Andersen’s study, which will also be studied by 
me are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. 
3.1.3 Material 
Measuring de-commodification and stratification exactly as Esping-Andersen did 
is difficult, as it always is when reproducing a study, but also since the 
operationalization is too specific for databases and close to impossible to find the 
same sources as used in “Three Worlds”, mostly due to a lack of explaining which 
sources are used to which variables. The problem with finding data that 
corresponds to the one used in “Three Worlds”, which other researchers have 
noted (Scruggs & Allan 2006; 2008), is that Esping-Andersen states the sources 
but not which report that are used or a clear definition of the variables, which 
leaves the replicating researcher in a difficult situation. Moreover, some of the 
reports that are referred to are not publicly available. Therefore, different data 
sources will be used in this study to complete each other.  
The difficulty of validating such a landmark study such as “Three Worlds” 
inspired Scruggs et al. to create a dataset consisting of variables that are not 
available elsewhere. Thus the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset (CWED) 
was created. CWED consist of less aggregated data on three social insurance 
programs: sickness, unemployment and pensions. CWED2 is the newest edition 
and is a dataset that contains information about the structure and generosity of 
social insurance benefits in 33 countries around the world, starting in the postwar 
period. The dataset is in part inspired Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds” 
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(CWED2 Codebook) as the variables in the dataset are meant measure de-
commodification. Moreover, CWED was founded as a complement to the OECD 
database, measuring less aggregated data. The reason for choosing to work with 
the CWED dataset and not others is that it consist of variables utterly close to 
those used by Esping-Andersen, and that these variables are not available in any 
other dataset. 
The alternative to using CWED2 would be a thorough investigation of each 
country’s pension, unemployment and sickness benefit system, income- and tax 
system etc. The problem with conducting such a study is the difficulty to know 18 
countries benefit- and tax systems in detail good enough to compare them and not 
miss any details in the different countries redistribution system. By using a dataset 
that allows variables that are close to those in “Three Worlds” minimizes 
measurement error as it is designed for comparison between countries. The 
Comparative Welfares Entitlements Dataset (CWED2) contains variables that are 
comparable to those used by Esping-Andersen, although there is a slight variation.  
What to be noted is that Scruggs and Allan, co-founders (et al.) of CWED, 
made a replication of Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds”, of the two dimensions 
de-commodification (2006) and stratification (2008) using CWED data in the 
former, both on the original year of 1980 and regarding stratification, time series 
to 2002. The de-commodification study was designed as first replicating “Three 
Worlds” as close as possible (trying to overcome the difficulty of data collecting 
with regards of the same variables as Esping-Andersen) and later suggesting an 
alternative “benefit generosity index” as a measure of de-commodification. The 
benefit generosity index differs mainly in the respect of attaining insurance 
coverage, which the authors argue is erroneous to leave out when comparing 
social insurance programs (Scruggs & Allan 2006). The stratification study was 
designed replicating “Three Worlds as originating from the year 1980 and with a 
time series to the year 2002 (Scruggs & Allan 2008). The main findings of these 
studies were an inconsistency in the scoring method conducted in “Three Worlds” 
and not such a clear clustering as in the original study. However, what Scruggs 
and Allan do not do is compare the findings between the two articles and thus 
stratification and de-commodification within and between the 18 countries, which 
is done in this study. Also, there is a lack of comparison of how and which 
variables that have shifted within the two defining dimensions of a welfare state 
regime as they only intent to test “Three Worlds” and not analyze the findings of 
welfare state clustering. It is mainly in these respects that the study I am 
conducting differs from the one conducted by Scruggs and Allan as both are 
aiming to replicate “Three Worlds”, using CWED data as empirics for the de-
commodification index. I do however intend to replicate “Three Worlds” and not 
use the suggested “benefit generosity index” (Scruggs & Allan 2006) as I aim to 
reproduce “Three Worlds” and the regimes described there. If using the suggested 
benefit index, the operationalization is further from the one in “Three Worlds” 
than what would be desired. Though, it is important to note the similarities 
between this study and the ones carried out by Scruggs and Allan (2006, 2008), 
although differing in the chosen time period and analytical purpose. 
  20 
When measuring de-commodification, the CWED2 dataset is used and when 
measuring stratification, different sources, both databases and reports, are used 
such as CWED2, OECD Statistics and Social Security Programs throughout the 
World (Social Security Administration, USA). These sources are used as they first 
and foremost provide the sought-after variables, secondly as they such as “Social 
Security Programs throughout the World” represent the source used in “Three 
Worlds”, and thirdly as present reliable data that allows for country comparisons. 
The variables used are presented in next section. Which sources that adheres to 
which variable is found in Appendix, Variable Oversight. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework Operationalized 
As described in the previous chapter, Esping-Andersen defines a welfare-state 
regime as a combination of the two concepts: de-commodification and 
stratification (1990). In order to measure these concepts, Esping-Andersen 
develops a framework for this purpose, which is described below. The theoretical 
framework in this study is the same as in “Three Worlds” although the 
operationalization differs to some extent as other variables, but mostly other 
sources, had to be used. The operationalization used in this study will be 
explained in this section, firstly by describing Esping-Andersen’s take on de-
commodification and stratification, to later describe how this study is different. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) divides the first theoretical concept, de-
commodification, into three parts of the social security system: pensions, sickness 
and unemployment. Stratification is divided as to measure the level of liberalism, 
conservatism and socialism within each country. The focus of the study lies on 
social security systems, which have come to be a critique as a delimitation of the 
generalizability of the “Three Worlds”, if social security can be considered as a 
proxy for the entire welfare state. Esping-Andersen meets this critique by stating 
that “Three Worlds” indeed is focusing on the relation between the state and 
market and thus is income related. However, as the concept regime focus on the 
private-public mix, it is thus what is intended (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.73ff).   
Esping-Andersen (1990) measures the level de-commodification within each 
country for pensions, sickness and unemployment insurance similarly. Pension 
measures consist of minimum pension benefits, standard pension benefits, 
contribution period and the individual’s share of pension financing. The level of 
de-commodification for sickness and unemployment insurances are measured as 
the benefit replacement rate, qualification period for benefit, waiting days before 
benefits are paid and duration of benefit. In table 3.2.1 the operationalization 
Esping-Andersen made is described, with the operationalization made in this 
study on the right hand side (for detailed information about the variables, see 
variable oversight in Appendix, or CWED Codebook).  
As can be noted in table 3.2.1, there is a strong similarity between the 
frameworks, but they differ to a small extent, which different databases always 
do. The only real difference between this study’s framework and Esping-
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Andersen’s might lie in the measuring of pension benefits; where Esping-
Andersen uses minimum and standard pension benefits for a standard production 
worker earning average wages, CWED2 has got a variable for minimum and 
standard pension replacement rates computed from a (fictional) worker’s average 
production wage. As the explanation in “Three Worlds” is not as explicit as 
wanted for an absolute replication, it is difficult to know what is meant by 
minimum and standard pensions (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990, p.54). In CWED2 
the minimum pension is interpreted as the pension “[…] that is payable to 
someone above the standard retirement age”. The standard pension is interpreted 
as the “[…] accrued public pension due to a worker who: (a) is fully insured […]; 
(b) earned APW wages
1
 in each year of their working life” (Scruggs & Allan 
2006, p.58). As it is said, there might be no difference between the original 
variable and the one used in this study, the problem is that there is no way to 
know how big the difference is as Esping-Andersen does not describe it fully. 
 
Table 3.2.1 De-commodification variables 
 Original variables Reproduction variables 
Pension Minimum pension benefits for a standard production 
worker earning average wages. The replacement rate 
here (as elsewhere) is the ratio of the benefits to 
normal worker earnings in that year, both benefits and 
earnings, net of taxes. 
Minimum pension replacement rate 
for a single production worker. 
 Standard pension benefits of a normal worker, 
calculated as above. 
Standard pension replacement rate for 
a single production worker. 
 Contribution period, measured as numbers of years of 
contributions (or employment) required to qualify for a 
standard pension (scored inversely). 
“Standard” number of years of 
pension insurance to be considered 
fully covered. 
 Individual’s share of pension financing. The ratio of employee pension 
contributions to employer and 
employee pension contributions. 
Sickness and 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Benefit replacement rates (net) for a standard worker 
during the first 26 weeks of illness/unemployment. 
Replacement rate for a single 
production worker. 
 Number of weeks of employment required prior to 
qualification. 
Qualification period: Weeks of 
insurance needed to qualify for 
benefit. 
 Number of waiting days before benefits are paid. Waiting days: Days one must wait to 
start receiving benefit after becoming 
unemployed/sick. 
 Number of weeks in which a benefit can be maintained 
. 
Duration: Weeks of benefit 
entitlement excluding times of means-
tested assistance or long-term 
disability/invalidity pensions. 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p.54)  (CWED Codebook) 
 
 
As in any dataset there are a few missing values, which in this case regards the 
coverage rates. To solve this problem, coverage rates to the closest year where 
data is available are used. However, in a few cases there was no, or very old data 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 Average Production Worker Wage (APWW), see Appendix, variable oversight or CWED Codebook for 
definition. 
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available for coverage rates. Normally in a quantitative study, missing values are 
not devastating for the study, but in this case where each value is given a score 
that is used for comparison, and there can be no missing scores. Therefore, a 
growth rate for earlier replacement rates was computed and thus a trend estimated 
coverage rate. Growth rates for Austria, Germany and Sweden 2010 were 
computed from earlier pension coverage rates, as rates were available until 2003. 
However, pension coverage rates are quite stable for all countries during the 
studied period; it would be quite safe to assume a small or no change at all in 
pension take-up rates. But in order to follow the pension coverage trend, growth 
rates were computed. Although the result was almost identical to the base year as 
growth rates were very low. Italy’s unemployment insurance coverage rate was 
not covered for after 1980. Estimating a growth trend due to 1980’s data and even 
earlier, would not be accurate or justifiable. Therefore, a growth rate for Italy’s 
sickness insurance was used in order to compute the coverage rate for the 
unemployment insurance for year 2000 and 2010, with 1980’s unemployment 
insurance coverage as a base year. The sickness insurance was used as a trend 
estimator as the unemployment and sickness insurance, in my opinion, tended to 
co-vary within the studied countries during the studied period, more than the 
pension coverage. This is a weakness in the results for Italy’s de-commodification 
index worth noting (for more information see Variable Oversight in Appendix).  
The scoring method used to illustrate the de-commodification clustering in 
“Three Worlds” is also used in this study. The scoring is designed for each 
country, for each of the three social security systems: pension unemployment and 
sickness benefits; consisting of the variables described in this section. All 
variables are scored 1-3 depending on their relation to the mean; countries with a 
de-commodification index-score one standard deviation above the mean are 
labeled the number 3, and more than one standard deviation below the mean as 1. 
The countries that scored 2, are thus the medium “de-commodifying” countries, 
and are those that are less than one standard deviation above and less than one 
standard deviation below the mean. The mean is computed after deleting outliers. 
After each variable has got a score, the added score for each insurance is 
computed. Then, the insurance scores are weighted by the insurance coverage. 
Lastly, the weighted score are combined into one de-commodification index 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p.54).  
There is however one exception, as the pension system in Australia is means-
testing, Esping-Andersen chooses to score the variable “contribution period” as 0 
and the pension index-score is weighted by 0.5 representing the take-up rate. 
Moreover, replacement rates are multiplied by two for all countries and social 
programs as to reflect “the singular importance of replacement rates for people’s 
welfare work choices” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.54). Treating means-tested 
systems as weighted with 0.5 and replacement rates multiplied with two is not 
particularly explained in “Three Worlds” besides that “This “negative” scoring 
reflects the fact that means-tested are highly conditional in terms of offering 
rights” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.54). Scruggs and Allan describe it as a 
“penalty” for Australia for using a system with means-tested benefits. Moreover, 
they state that this scoring affects Australia’s position within the welfare state 
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clusters to a great extent, especially since the actual coverage rate is above one 
half of the population. Scruggs and Allan solves this problem through using the 
actual take-up rates instead of weighting means-tested systems with 0.5 (2006, 
pp.64-65). I will however choose to use the same scoring method as Esping-
Andersen. The reason for choosing the same scoring methods is the same as stated 
earlier; in order to have a methodology as close as possible to the one in “Three 
Worlds” and thus compare whether the clusters illustrated in 1990 are still valid. It 
would surely give a result different from the one in “Three Worlds” if choosing to 
deviate from the methodological path Esping-Andersen used (when not 
necessary). Though, it is not only the cluster scoring of 1-3 that will be reported in 
the results, but also the de-commodification index-scores. By presenting both 
scores, the hope is to give a transparent result.  
Stratification is the other defining dimension of a welfare state according to 
Esping-Andersen, and the framework presented by him and the used in this study 
is presented in table 3.2.2, with the scoring metric to the right. Stratification is 
measured through three different indexes: a conservative, liberal and socialist. The 
conservative index is measured as to the degree of corporatism (number of 
occupationally distinct public pension schemes) and degree of etatism 
(compensation to government employees as a percentage of total expenditure). 
The liberal index measures the number of means-tested benefit systems, private 
pension expenditure and private health expenditure. Lastly, the socialist index 
measures average benefit universalism (average coverage of sickness-, 
unemployment insurances and pensions) and benefit equality (the ratio of 
minimum to standard pension benefits). The idea for having three different 
indexes is to illustrate how countries that belong to a certain cluster scores high in 
that cluster, and then scores low on the other two indexes. However, as Esping-
Andersen describes it, there are no ideal-types in the real world, but hybrids, and 
the task is to find patterns for clustering more than fixed ones (Esping-Andersen 
1990, pp.73-75). The stratification framework used in this study varies to a greater 
extent to the one in “Three Worlds” than the one for de-commodification, 
although the degree is not extensive. The difference lies with the variables for 
etatism, means-tested poor-relief and benefit equality – besides using different 
sources than the original (sources belonging to each variable are found in the 
Variable Oversight, Appendix). 
The first variable that measures conservatism, “number of occupationally 
distinct public pension schemes”, is computed the same way as in “Three 
Worlds”, using the same source: Social Security Systems throughout the World 
(SSA). The data gathered by Esping-Andersen (1990) and later by Scruggs and 
Allan (2008) from the SSA publication is however open for interpretation as none 
of them really explains how they define “number of occupationally distinct public 
pension schemes: major schemes only”. As the earliest publication available 
online is from 2002, it is this year’s data that will be used in the study, which is 
the one used by Scruggs and Allan (2008). Therefore, the study by Esping-
Andersen and Scruggs & Allan is used as a comparison when computing the 
variable. Within each publication of Social Security Programs throughout the 
World, there is a country summary. Within each country summary, there is a 
  24 
section on “Old age, disability and survivor” which covers national pension 
schemes. 
 
Table 3.2.2 Stratification variables 
 Original variables Reproduction variables Scoring 
Conservative Degree of corporatism: 
Measured as number of 
occupationally distinct 
public pension schemes. 
Degree of corporatism: 
Measured as number of 
occupationally distinct 
public pension schemes. 
Nations with less than, or equal to, 2 
separate occupationally distinct 
pension programs have been given 
the score of 0; nations between 2 and 
5 (inclusive) have been given a score 
of 2; and nations with more than 5 
are scored 4. 
 Degree of etatism: 
Measured as expenditure 
on pensions to government 
employees as % of GDP; 
reflects the degree to 
which the civil service is 
granted special welfare 
privileges. 
Degree of etatism: 
government expenditure 
on general government 
employees, as a % of GDP.  
Where the share is less ore equal to 
1% the core 0 is given, between 1-
2.1% a score of 2, 2.2% and above, 
score 4. 
Liberal Means-tested poor-relief as 
a % of total public social 
expenditure. 
Number of means-tested 
social security programs.  
Less than 3 % a score of 0, 3-8% a 
score of 2, more than 8% a score of 4. 
 Private pensions as a % of 
total pensions. 
Private pension 
expenditure as a % of total 
pension expenditure. 
If the share is less than 10% a score of 
0, 10-15% a score of 2, more than 
16% a score of 4. 
 Private health spending as a 
% of total. 
Private health spending as a 
% of total health 
expenditure. 
If the share is less than 10% a score of 
0, 10-20% a score of 2, more than 
21% a score of 4. 
Socialist Average universalism: 
average for sickness, 
unemployment and 
pensions. Universalism 
measures the percentage of 
the relevant population 
(labor force16-65 years old) 
covered under respective 
programs. 
Average universalism: 
average for sickness, 
unemployment and 
pensions. 
Less than 60% covered is considered 
as low and equals a score of 0, 61-
85% a score of 2, and coverage above 
85% a score of 4. Australia and New 
Zealand are means-testing a score of 
0. 
 Average benefit equality, 
benefit differentials: based 
on what a standard worker 
will receive as a standard 
benefit and what the 
maximum benefit is. 
Pension benefit equality: 
ratio based on what a 
standard worker will 
receive as a minimum 
pension and what the 
standard benefit is. 
If standard benefits are less than 55% 
of maximum benefits - a score of 0 
(reflecting high differentials), 55-80% 
a score of 2, and above 80% a score 
of 4. 
 (Esping-Andersen 
1990, pp.70-72) 
 
(CWED Codebook) (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
pp.77-78) 
 
If differences between original variable and the one used in this study, it is marked in bold. NB! Sources differ between 
original variable and this study, see Appendix for details. 
Scoring metric in this study is identical to the one designed by Esping-Andersen and described in this column. It is 
identical except for “Degree of etatism” and “Number of Means-Tested social security systems” as this variable 
differs from the original variable. The scoring metric for de-commodification is used here instead: one standard 
deviation above the mean is scored 4, within one standard deviation from the means is scored 2, one standard 
deviation below the mean, 0. 
 
Within this headline there is a section that describes the coverage; and this is 
where the “number of occupationally distinct pension schemes” are found. The 
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number of schemes is counted as one, unless exceptions – such as the French 
special pension systems for those with an occupation within the sectors of 
agriculture, mining, public employees etc., which are counted as one individually 
distinct pension scheme (SSA Europe 2002, p.78). Regarding “major schemes 
only”: schemes that are considered as a part of an entire pension scheme are 
disregarded, e.g. the premium pension scheme in Sweden which is integrated in 
the universal pension system and thus only represent a smaller scheme covered by 
the same qualifying rules as the universal system (SSA Europe 2002, p.195). The 
exclusion of “smaller schemes” may seem arbitrary, but is the only way to 
approach the corporatist variable and make it similar to the one in “Three 
Worlds”. However, the interpretation of this variable is consistent within this 
study and the two years that are up for comparison, and hopefully will the detailed 
the description at least increases the transparency and allow for reproduction. 
The difficulty of finding data comparable to “Three Worlds” is mostly evident 
when it comes to measuring the degree of etatism and means-tested benefits as the 
sources used in “Three Worlds”, i.e. “The Cost of Social Security” (ILO) have 
stopped producing the two used variables: expenditure on pensions to government 
employees as percentage of GDP and means-tested poor-relief as a percentage of 
total public social expenditure. To solve the problem with the etatism variable, 
data regarding government expenditure on government employees are used, 
instead of the share of government employees’ pensions. Esping-Andersen argues 
that pensions is the most important of the welfare state transfers and thus the best 
indicator of how a nation chooses to allocate their resources (1990, pp.79-80). 
However, since data for pensions regarding government employees are not 
available in the searched databases, without looking into each country 
individually, there will be a slight difference in this variable as it is “the 
compensation to general government employees” in relation to GDP, that is used 
instead (OECD, “Government at a Glance 2013”). By only using “compensation” 
instead of pension, information could be missed, but as the variable still measures 
the degree to which the nations chooses to allocate resources to government 
employees, it is sufficiently close to the original variable. Notable with this 
variable is that it could measure the size of the public sector more than etatism, 
but that might be a critique to the original variable as well, as the higher pension 
expenditure, the greater the public sector.  
The first liberal variable, and the other variable that is difficult to investigate, 
as Esping-Andersen’s source ILO has stopped producing it, is “means-tested poor 
relief as a percentage of the total public social expenditures”. Besides ILO there 
are no evident databases that estimate the level of means-tested benefits in a 
comparative manner. The only way to estimate the impact of means-testing is to 
investigate each country individually. However, this would be an essay in itself as 
it takes thorough knowledge of each individual country’s social security system to 
be able to draw any conclusions and thus present them for comparison. 
Nonetheless, there will be a variable that measures means-tested benefits, 
although it is set out to be a count of the number of means-tested systems within 
each country, covering the fields of sickness, maternity, old age, invalidity, 
survivors, family, allowances, work injury, unemployment (eight in total). This 
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variable is thus intentionally constructed in a similar manner to the corporatist 
variable which measures the number of occupationally distinct public pension 
schemes, as this one measures the number of means-tested public social security 
systems. There is a notable difference between the variable that I have computed 
and the one in “Three Worlds”, where the original variable measures how much of 
the public funds that are put into means-tested poor relief programs and thus 
measures the systems importance within a country to a greater extent. However, 
counting the occurrence of means-tested systems illustrates which countries that 
uses them and to what extent within the eight parts of social security described 
above. Therefore, the variable used in this study differs from the original, but still 
measures the level means-tested systems within a country, and thus etatism. 
As there are two variables used in this study that are quite different from the 
one in “There Worlds”, the same scoring cannot be applied. Instead a similar 
scoring to the de-commodification index is used, where the mean and standard 
deviation is computed; 0 if one standard deviation below the mean, 2 if one 
standard deviation within the mean, and 4 if one standard deviation above the 
mean. This metric is used as it is applied in another part in the study, but also as it 
is a more neutral measure than to estimate what would be considered as “etatist” 
and “liberal” regarding number of means-tested social security systems.  
The second and third liberal indicators: “private pension expenditure” and 
“private health expenditure” are retrieved from OECD Pension Indicators and the 
OECD Reports Health at a Glance (2001, 2011). The variables are almost the 
same as used in “Three Worlds” and differ only to the extent that the data is 
retrieved from different sources.  
The final two variables measuring stratification are the social democratic ones: 
universalism and benefit equality, where both are found in CWED2. Esping-
Andersen measures the “average universalism” within the three social programs: 
pensions, unemployment and sickness. In CWED2 there is a variable that 
measures the coverage on each of the three social programs in each country, 
measuring the percentage of the covered population. The three coverage-variables 
will be combined to see the average coverage of these three insurances. The other 
socialist variable, benefit equality, is meant to measure the benefit differentials, 
“based on what a standard worker will receive as a standard benefit and what the 
maximum benefit is”. As CWED2 only has got variables for the minimum and 
standard pension benefits and not the standard replacement rate for both sickness 
and unemployment, it is only the pension benefit equality that will be measured in 
this study, and is thus a difference between “Three Worlds”. However, as Esping-
Andersen claims, pensions is the most important transfer system within the 
welfare state as it accounts for more than 10% of GDP in most nations, and well 
illustrates the link between market and state; work and leisure, earned income and 
redistribution (1990, pp.79-80), the leap to only use pension benefits while 
measuring benefit equality should not be too great, though it is a difference worth 
noting. The scoring metric described by Esping-Andersen is used on this variable 
even though there is a slight difference.  
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4 Exploring Welfare-State Regimes for 
the 21
st
 Century 
In this chapter the results of the study will be presented. The presentation will be 
structured as to investigate the two dimensions of a welfare-state regime 
separately, first to describe the results for de-commodification and second, 
stratification. The focus of the analysis lies on the change in de-commodification 
and stratification that has occurred during the first decade of the 21
st
 century. 
Also, the results will be compared to the findings in Esping-Andersen’s “Three 
Worlds” (1990), however, as the analytical models differ to some extent, care 
must be taken not to overstate comparisons with the previous study’s results. 
Lastly, the two dimensions de-commodification and stratification will be 
compared for each year individually to see whether there is a correspondence 
between the results for the two dimensions. 
4.1 De-commodification 
The first defining dimension of a welfare-state regime is de-commodification. De-
commodification is defined as the level of independence a worker can get outside 
the market, and thus which living standards that could be expected, provided by 
the state. Esping-Andersen chooses to investigate the level of de-commodification 
out of the three social security programs: sickness, unemployment and pension – 
which is also done in this study. The highest level of de-commodification 
indicates a social democratic welfare-state regime, a modest level a conservative 
and a low level of de-commodification a liberal.  
In order to measure the level of de-commodification, the operationalization of 
the theoretical framework described in section 3.2 is used. The data that is 
analyzed is presented in Appendix, table 8.2.1.1 for year 2000 and table 8.2.1.4 
for year 2010. The mean value and standard deviation was computed for each of 
the variables, with deleted extreme values. Then each value, for each country, was 
given the score 1-3 depending on the distance to the mean: 1 was given if the 
value was more than one standard deviation below the mean, 2 if the value lies 
within one standard deviation below and above the mean and 3 if the value lies 
above one standard deviation of the mean. For the variables that indicate 
qualification period, waiting days and employee funding, scoring is inverted as a 
lower value indicates a higher level of de-commodification and not the opposite. 
In some cases there are values very close to the cutting point, thus indicating the 
score could be either or, but this author chose to be strict to the scoring rules. 
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However, scores that are close to the cutting points are marked in bold to illustrate 
which countries could possibly belong to another group (see Appendix, tables: de-
commodification for exact scoring).  
After the de-commodification scores are given, the additive score for each 
individual social insurance is computed and then weighted with the insurances 
coverage rates (coverage rates are presented in Appendix, tables 8.2.1.2, 8.2.1.5). 
The weighted de-commodification scores are added up, representing the de-
commodification index, which is the basis for analyzing welfare regime clusters. 
The de-commodification index and thus clustering is presented in table 4.1.1 
below. 
 
Table. 4.1.1 Ranking order of de-commodification (2000) 
 Esping-Andersen  
(1980) 
  De-commodification  
ranking 
 (2000) 
 
1 Sweden  39,1 1 Netherlands  37,23 
2 Norway 38,3 2 Norway  36,28 
3 Denmark 38,1 3 Switzerland  35,48 
4 Netherlands 32,4 4 Denmark  34,83 
5 Belgium 32,4 5 Sweden  32,6 
6 Austria 31,1 6 Germany 32,2 
      
7 Switzerland 29,8 7 France 30,7 
8 Finland 29,2 8 Finland 30,4 
9 Germany 27,7 9 Belgium 29,6 
10 France 27,5 10 Austria 29,03 
11 Japan 27,1 11 UK 27,44 
12 Italy 24,1 12 Canada 26,57 
      
13 UK 23,4 13 Italy 26,35 
14 Ireland 23,3 14 Ireland 25,93 
15 Canada 22 15 Japan 24,29 
16 New Zealand 17,1 16 New Zealand 20,9 
17 USA 13,8 17 USA 20,36 
18 Australia 13 18 Australia 15,5 
      
 Mean 27,2    
 St.d. 7,7    
 
The result shows a similar pattern to the one found by Esping-Andersen in 
1990 (on 1980’s data). There are northern European countries found at the top of 
the scale: Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Germany. 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark are countries that usually counts as social 
democratic countries and was so labeled by Esping-Andersen. Netherlands was 
considered a social democratic country in “Three Worlds” thus leaving a 
corresponding result. Netherlands is in 2000 also the top de-commodifying 
country. Switzerland and Germany has moved up on the de-commodification 
scale as they earlier have been considered as conservative. Esping-Andersen even 
uses Germany as an example of the ideal-type conservative state, alongside 
Sweden as the core social democratic and USA as the liberal (cf. 1990, pp.191ff), 
which is worth noting as Germany now is found in the group that is considered 
social democratic.  
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The group of more modest leveled de-commodifiers is more diversified. In a 
year 2000 context the “conservative” group consists of France, Finland, Belgium, 
Austria, United Kingdom and Canada. France and Finland are the only two 
countries that are still conservative compared to “Three Worlds”. Austria and 
Belgium both have received a lower scoring in relation to the others and moved 
down from the social democratic group to conservative. Canada and United 
Kingdom has moved from the opposite direction, from the liberal group to a 
higher de-commodification level in the conservative cluster. 
The lowest level of de-commodification is found in Italy, Ireland, Japan, New 
Zealand, USA and Australia. In this group, it is only Italy and Japan that has 
shifted positions from the conservative to what is considered a more liberal level 
of de-commodification. 
The conclusions that could be drawn from the results from year 2000 is that 
there is still a pattern along the de-commodification level, although the ideological 
basis of Esping-Andersen’s ideal-types are not as evident as in 1980, eg. as 
conservative countries such as Switzerland and Germany now are considered 
social democratic, while Japan and Italy are considered as liberal. Other important 
conclusions is that Netherlands now offers the highest level of de-
commodification, and has pushed Sweden of its throne, as Sweden has been 
considered “the archetypical social democratic country” due to its social 
democratic political tradition but also due to the consistent highest score when 
examining de-commodification (Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). Moreover, 
New Zealand, USA and Australia are still at the bottom of the scale as the least 
de-commodifying countries. What also can be noted is the level of de-
commodification between this analysis and Esping-Andersen’s; levels of de-
commodification have increased in all countries but the social democratic, where 
the level has decreased (accept for Japan where de-commodification has 
decreased and the Netherlands where there has been an increase). However, as the 
change is based on two different studies one cannot be too sure that there has been 
such a shift. Comparing exact de-commodification score are not methodologically 
defendable, although inter-relational positioning can be to a greater extent.  
To compare whether there has been a shift in de-commodification during the 
first decade of the 21
st
 century, the same analysis has been conducted for the year 
2010. Moreover, in table 4.1.2, a column is added to illustrate the differences in 
de-commodification between 2000 and 2010. It is important to emphasize the 
difference in level of de-commodification and not only the ranking, as the ranking 
depends on the inter-relational position and is based on the notion that there are 
three welfare-state regimes clusters while the level of de-commodification takes 
into account whether there has been a change within the country. It is possible to 
compare the de-commodification level between 2000 and 2010 as the conduct is 
identical, but caution is to be had if comparing the index to Esping-Andersen’s 
analysis. Then it is preferable to compare the inter-relational ranking as this is less 
independent to scoring differences. 
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Table 4.1.2. Ranking order of de-commodification, total 
 Esping-Andersen  
De-comm. 
(1980) 
  De-comm. 
ranking 
 (2000) 
  De-comm. 
ranking 
(2010) 
 Change  
00-10 
1 Sweden  39,1 1 Netherlands  37,23 1 Norway 38,46 +2,18 
2 Norway 38,3 2 Norway  36,28 2 Netherlands 37,17 -0,06 
3 Denmark 38,1 3 Switzerland  35,48 3 Belgium 33,6 +4,14 
4 Netherlands 32,4 4 Denmark  34,83 4 Switzerland 32,76 -2,72 
5 Belgium 32,4 5 Sweden  32,6 5 Ireland 32,42 +6,49 
6 Austria 31,1 6 Germany 32,2 6 Denmark 30,76 -4,07 
          
7 Switzerland 29,8 7 France 30,7 7 France 30,7 0 
8 Finland 29,2 8 Finland 30,4 8 Japan  30,64 +6,35 
9 Germany 27,7 9 Belgium 29,6 9 Sweden 30,24 -2,36 
10 France 27,5 10 Austria 29,03 10 Finland 29,14 -1,26 
11 Japan 27,1 11 UK 27,44 11 Austria 28,46 -0,57 
12 Italy 24,1 12 Canada 26,57 12 Germany 26,29 -5,91 
          
13 UK 23,4 13 Italy 26,35 13 Canada 24,72 -1,85 
14 Ireland 23,3 14 Ireland 25,93 14 Italy 24,678 -1,672 
15 Canada 22 15 Japan 24,29 15 UK 24,59 -2,85 
16 New Zealand 17,1 16 New Zealand 20,9 16 New Zealand 21,5 +0,6 
17 USA 13,8 17 USA 20,36 17 USA 20,75 +0,39 
18 Australia 13 18 Australia 15,5 18 Australia 15,5 0 
          
 Mean 27,2        
 St.d. 7,7        
 
The 2010 analysis shows that Norway is now the top de-commodifying 
country, followed by the Netherlands. Norway’s index increase reflects an 
increase in the minimum pension replacement rate, placing it at the top of the de-
commodification scale (see Appendix, tables 8.2.1.1, 8.2.1.4). Other countries that 
illustrate high levels of de-commodification are Belgium, Switzerland, Ireland and 
Denmark. From the analysis of the year 2000 it is thus Belgium and Ireland that 
has increased both their level of de-commodification and ranking, and they are the 
newcomers in this group. Especially Ireland has increased its level of de-
commodification significantly during the past decade, moving from the liberal 
group in both Esping-Andersen’s analysis and the analysis conducted for the year 
2000, to being the fifth most de-commodifying country. The reason for this drastic 
change for Ireland is an increase in sickness- and standard pension replacement 
rates and an increase in coverage rates, while Belgium has increased both 
minimum and standard pension replacement rates. Denmark on the other hand is 
still holding a high level of de-commodification in relation to the other countries, 
but has decreased its actual index level by as much as Belgium has increased. The 
change for Denmark lies in a large drop of unemployment insurance coverage, but 
also depends on the scoring for the minimum pension replacement rate where the 
rate remains the same but the mean and standard deviation differs from 2000 to 
2010 (see appendix table 8.2.1.1, 8.2.1.4).  
Moving on to the countries with a more modest level of de-commodification, 
one can find France, Japan, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Germany. The countries 
that remain in this category since year 2000 are France, Finland and Austria of 
which had none or a minor change in actual de-commodification level and 
ranking. The newcomers are thus Japan, Sweden and Germany. Japan has 
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experienced a large increase in de-commodification that has resulted in its moving 
up to the conservative group, while Germany has experienced an equal drop in de-
commodification and is moving down in ranking. The steep increase in Japan’s 
de-commodification level mainly reflects the high increase in pension coverage, 
while Germany’s decrease reflects a lowering of sickness- and standard pension 
replacement rates and a general decrease of insurance coverage rates (see 
Appendix, tables 8.2.1.2, 8.2.1.5). Sweden on the other hand has certainly left its 
position as the most de-commodifying country, representing the ninth country in 
this count. However, the actual decrease in de-commodification is not too large in 
comparison to 2000, and the level of de-commodification in 2010 is almost the 
same as for Denmark, France and Japan. However, there has been an evident 
change in Sweden’s insurance coverage rates, where coverage has decreased 
during the investigated decade, which is mirrored in the de-commodification 
index (see Appendix tables 8.2.1.2, 8.2.1.5).  
The group with the lowest level of de-commodification is represented by 
Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, New Zealand, USA and Australia. New Zealand, 
USA and Australia remains consistently in the bottom three, for the year 2000, 
2010 and in Esping-Andersen’s study leaving them to be the most consistent 
group of them all. Canada and UK have both experienced a decrease in their level 
of de-commodification, changing from a modest level of de-commodification to a 
lower one in relation to other countries; UK’s decrease depends on a longer 
qualification period for unemployment insurance and pension, while Canada’s 
change depends on a longer qualification period for pensions and a scoring 
difference between 2000 and 2010 regarding sickness insurance duration. 
However, the changes for UK and Canada are minor in between 2000-2010. The 
categorization of Canada and UK as liberal, or low de-commodifiers is more in 
line with Esping-Andersen’s study than it is similar to the one conducted for year 
2000. Italy has continued to decrease its level of de-commodification, although a 
minor decrease, moving further down the de-commodification ranking, being the 
fourth least de-commodifying country. 
To sum up the findings of the de-commodification analysis between year 2000 
and 2010: it is firstly evident that the level of de-commodification varies within 
and between countries as no cluster is fixed over the investigated period. 
However, what is evident is that countries do vary along a de-commodification 
axis and might cluster over time, as a decade might be a small window of time to 
fix actual clusters if in a transition period, and if fixed clusters exist. Nonetheless, 
the most consistent groups of countries were those that clustered at the bottom or 
the top of the de-commodification index, it was the “modest leveled” group that 
was the most diverse one. Australia, New Zealand, USA and Italy resided 
consistently at the bottom, while Norway, Denmark, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands resided at the top. The surprises was the steep increase in de-
commodification by Japan and Ireland, the large decrease in de-commodification 
for Denmark and Germany, and the large decrease in ranking for Sweden and 
Italy. 
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4.2 Stratification 
The second dimension of a welfare-state regime is stratification, or the welfare 
state as a system of stratification. The level of stratification is measured through 
three indexes; conservative, liberal and socialist. The conservative index is 
measured as to the degree of corporatism (number of occupationally distinct 
public pension schemes) and degree of etatism (compensation to government 
employees as a percentage of total expenditure). The liberal index measures the 
number of means-tested benefit systems, private pension expenditure and private 
health expenditure. Lastly, the socialist index measures average benefit 
universalism (average coverage of sickness-, unemployment insurances and 
pensions) and benefit equality (the ratio of minimum to standard pension 
benefits). Depending on how well countries perform within the indexes, they are 
given a score on each variable where 4 represent a high level of 
conservatism/liberalism/socialism, 2 for a medium level and 0 for a low level. 
Exact scoring metrics are described in section 3.2 and follows the directions 
described in “Three Worlds” (Esping-Andersen 1990, pp.77-78).  
The two variables that differs from “Three Worlds”, due to a lack of data, are 
scored using the same metric as when scoring the de-commodification variables; 
if values are one standard deviation or more below the mean, score is 0, and if 
values are one standard deviation or more above the mean, score is 4. The 
variables for where this metric is used are “compensation to government 
employees” and “means-tested benefit system” in the conservative and liberal 
index respectively. The idea for this scoring is to illustrate how countries that 
belong to a certain cluster scores high in that cluster, and then scores low on the 
other two indexes. However, as Esping-Andersen describes it, there are no ideal-
types in the real world, but hybrids, and the task is to find patterns for clustering 
more than fixed ones (Esping-Andersen 1990, pp.73-75. 
Table 4.2.1 thus illustrates the clustering of countries with a high, medium or 
low scoring on each index during year 2000. The division of high, medium and 
low follows how the result is presented in “Three Worlds”, here illustrated in the 
right hand columns. The values of the liberal index are greater than the other 
indexes as it consist of three variables instead of two, which makes comparing 
values between the indexes futile. However, comparing the indexes based on 
ranking, or values within indexes between 2000 and 2010 is possible. 
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Table 4.2.1. Stratification (2000) 
Stratification (2000)   Esping-Andersen (1980) 
Conservative  Liberal  Socialism  Conservative  Liberal  Socialist  
Austria  6 Australia 12 Denmark 8 Austria 8 Canada 12 Denmark 8 
Finland 6 New Zealand 12 Ireland 8 Belgium 8 Switzerland 12 Norway 8 
France 6 Canada 10 Netherlands 8 France 8 United States 12 Sweden 8 
Norway 6 Netherlands 10 Switzerland 8 Germany 8 Australia 10 Finland 6 
  USA 10 Belgium 6 Italy 8 Japan 10 Netherlands 6 
Belgium 4   Canada 6       
Denmark 4 UK 8 France 6 Finland 6 France 8 Australia 4 
Germany 4 Switzerland 8 Norway 6 Ireland 4 Netherlands 8 Belgium 4 
Italy 4 Denmark 8 Sweden 6 Japan 4 Denmark 6 Canada 4 
Japan 4 Belgium 6   Netherlands 4 Germany 6 Germany 4 
Netherlands 4 Finland 6 Australia 4 Norway 4 Italy 6 New Zealand 4 
Sweden 4 Italy 6 Austria 4   UK 6 Switzerland 4 
USA 4 Norway 6 Finland 4 Canada 2   UK 4 
    Germany 4 Denmark 2 Austria 4   
Australia 2 France 4 Japan 4 New Zealand 2 Belgium 4 Austria 2 
Canada 2 Germany 4 New Zealand 4 Australia 0 Finland 4 France 2 
Ireland 2 Ireland 4 UK 4 Sweden 0 Ireland 2 Ireland 2 
New Zealand 2 Japan 2 USA 4 Switzerland 0 New Zealand 2 Japan 2 
UK 2 Sweden 2   UK 0 Norway 0 Italy 0 
Switzerland 0 Austria 0 Italy 2 USA 0 Sweden 0 USA 0 
 
As for year 2000, no countries score “high” on the conservative index, if 
“high” is considered as the score eight, as in Esping-Andersen’s study. But if one 
considers both six and eight as “high” as is done with the socialist index, four 
countries qualify as conservative: Austria, Finland, France and Norway. Those 
that score “high“ on the liberal index are Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
Netherlands and USA. Countries that score “high” on the socialist index are 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, France, Norway 
and Sweden. As stated and according to the theory, countries that tend to score 
“high” on one of the indexes either score “medium” or “low” on the other 
indexes, as they ought to adhere to one category of welfare state regimes. This 
notion seems quite consistent for the result in the analysis as most welfare states 
tended to adhere to one of the welfare-state regimes. However, Germany, Italy 
and Japan do not score “high” on either of the indexes, making this group of 
countries unable to be categorized in accordance with the theory. Notable is that 
data is missing for Japan for one of the variables on the liberal index, resulting in 
a lower score than it might be otherwise. But, as Japan scores zero and two on the 
existing liberal variables, and four is maximum, the missing variable would still 
not place Japan in the group that scores “high” on the liberal index. This is also 
the case for Japan for year 2010. Another question at issue is that some countries 
have scored “high” on multiple indexes: Canada (liberal/socialist), France 
(conservative/socialist), Netherlands (liberal/socialist) and Norway 
(conservative/socialist); either indicating hybrid regimes (cf. Esping-Andersen 
1990, pp.73-75) or a fault with the three-folded typology. Moreover, the countries 
that perform “high” on the indexes for year 2000 are not identical with the ones in 
“Three Worlds”, but there is a similarity between the two results; those that tend 
to score “high” in 2000 generally scored “high” in 1980 
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Table 4.2.2 Stratification (2000, 2010) 
 Stratification (2000)  Stratification (2010) 
Conservative  Liberal  Socialism  Conservative  Liberal  Socialism  
Austria  6 Australia 12 Denmark 8 Finland 8 Australia 12 Denmark 8 
Finland 6 New Zealand 12 Ireland 8 Norway 8 Canada 10 Ireland 8 
France 6 Canada 10 Netherlands 8 Austria 6 Netherlands 10 Netherlands 8 
Norway 6 Netherlands 10 Switzerland 8 France 6 New Zealand 10 Switzerland 8 
  USA 10 Belgium 6 Netherlands 6 USA 10 Belgium 6 
Belgium 4   Canada 6     Canada 6 
Denmark 4 UK 8 France 6 Belgium 4 Belgium 8 France 6 
Germany 4 Switzerland 8 Norway 6 Denmark 4 Denmark 8 Norway 6 
Italy 4 Denmark 8 Sweden 6 Germany 4 Finland 8 UK 6 
Japan 4 Belgium 6   Italy 4 France 8   
Netherlands 4 Finland 6 Australia 4 Sweden 4 Norway 8 Australia 4 
Sweden 4 Italy 6 Austria 4 USA 4 Switzerland 8 Austria 4 
USA 4 Norway 6 Finland 4   Austria 6 Finland 4 
    Germany 4 Australia 2 UK 6 Japan 4 
Australia 2 France 4 Japan 4 Canada 2   New Zealand 4 
Canada 2 Germany 4 New Zealand 4 Ireland 2 Germany 4 Sweden 4 
Ireland 2 Ireland 4 UK 4 Japan 2 Ireland 4   
New Zealand 2 Japan 2 USA 4 New Zealand 2 Italy 4 Germany 2 
UK 2 Sweden 2   UK 2 Sweden 4 Italy 2 
Switzerland 0 Austria 0 Italy 2 Switzerland 0 Japan 2 USA 0 
 
The stratification analysis for year 2010 shows an almost identical clustering 
at the top of each index if compared with the analysis for year 2000. The countries 
that are considered as conservative are: Finland, Norway, Austria, France and 
Netherlands. The Netherlands is the newcomer in this group and what has 
changed since 2000 is an increase of the number of occupationally distinct 
pension schemes from five to six, making the country qualify for a higher score 
on the conservative index (see Appendix, tables 8.2.2.1, 8.2.2.2). The Netherlands 
is thus present at the top of each index, representing a conservative, liberal and 
socialist welfare-state regime. That one country can represent all possible welfare-
state regimes is a break with the theory, but as studies since “Three Worlds” has 
shown, the Netherlands is an ambiguous welfare state which is difficult to 
categorize (cf. Esping-Andersen 1999, p.87). Norway on the other hand has 
increased its level of conservatism to the top score, due to an increase in the 
compensation to government employees of government spending and a consistent 
high number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes (see Appendix, 
tables 8.2.2.1, 8.2.2.2).  
The liberal index consists of the same countries as in 2000: Australia, Canada, 
Netherlands, New Zealand and USA. The only difference is that New Zealand has 
reduced its score by one step, mirroring a drop in private health expenditure (see 
Appendix, tables 8.2.2.1, 8.2.2.2).  
The socialist index does also remind of the one from 2000, with Denmark, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, France, Norway and United 
Kingdom at the top. The only difference is that United Kingdom has positioned 
itself in the top group while Sweden has reduced its index level and is now a 
“medium” socialist stratifier. United Kingdom has increased the pension benefit 
equality, hence the gap between minimum and standard pension rates, by eight 
percent during the studied decade, resulting in an increase in the socialist index. 
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Sweden on the other hand has reduced average benefit universalism from 95 % to 
85 % during the past decade, qualifying for a lower score on the margin (see 
Appendix, tables 8.2.2.1, 8.2.2.2).  
Also for year 2010, there are some countries that are failing to be categorized 
according to the theory. Germany, Italy and Japan are still scoring only “medium” 
or “low” on all of the indexes. The difference is that Sweden now adheres to this 
group of “low-scorers”. Moreover, Canada, France, Netherlands and Norway still 
score “high” on two indexes with the difference that Netherlands in 2010 score 
“high” on three indexes instead of two. 
The clustering of countries in the three indexes is presented in table 4.2.3 
below, with Esping-Andersen’s study on the right hand side. The conclusion from 
this analysis of welfare-state stratification is that the studied countries do 
generally score high on at least one index, with a few exceptions.  
 
Table 4.2.3 Stratification clustering 
Stratification 2000  2010  Esping-Andersen (1980) 
Conservative Liberal Socialist Conservative Liberal Socialist Conservative Liberal Socialist 
 Australia   Australia   Australia  
Austria   Austria   Austria   
  Belgium   Belgium Belgium   
 Canada Canada  Canada Canada  Canada  
  Denmark   Denmark   Denmark 
Finland   Finland     Finland 
France  France France  France France   
      Germany   
  Ireland   Ireland . . . 
      Italy   
       Japan  
 Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands   Netherlands 
 New 
Zealand 
  New 
Zealand 
 . . . 
Norway  Norway Norway  Norway   Norway 
  Sweden      Sweden 
  Switzerland   Switzerland  Switzerland  
     UK . . . 
 USA   USA   USA  
Countries that are missing from this table do so because they either score “medium” or “low” on each index, not qualifying 
within any welfare-state regime. Countries that are marked in bold denote a change 2010 compared to 2000. 
4.3 Combining De-commodification and 
Stratification: Can We See Clusters?  
In the previous sections there has been an investigation of the level of de-
commodification and stratification in three OECD countries, between year 2000 
and 2010. But what does it really say? Can we see the ideal-typical clustering 
today, what Esping-Andersen discovered yesterday? In “Three Worlds”, Esping-
Andersen never really investigates the relationship between these two concepts 
which is a criticism against the study. In this section de-commodification and 
stratification for each year will be analyzed separately, in order to see whether 
there are clusters and whether they are fixed or fluent over time. 
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In table 4.3.1, the results from year 2000 is presented, with de-
commodification on the left-side columns and stratification to the right. The 
results do co-vary between the two dimensions to a great extent. Eleven countries, 
and thus more than half of the studied countries, adhere to the same typology on a 
de-commodification and stratification axis: Australia (liberal), Austria 
(conservative), Denmark (socialist), Finland (conservative), France 
(conservative), Netherlands (socialist), New Zealand (liberal), Norway (socialist), 
Sweden (socialist), Switzerland (socialist) and USA (liberal).  
 
Table 4.3.1 Country clustering (2000) 
De-commodification 2000   Stratification 2000 
Conservative Liberal Socialist Conservative Liberal Socialist 
 Australia   Australia  
Austria   Austria   
Belgium     Belgium 
Canada    Canada Canada 
  Denmark   Denmark 
Finland   Finland   
France   France  France 
  Germany    
 Ireland    Ireland 
 Italy     
 Japan     
  Netherlands  Netherlands Netherlands 
 New Zealand   New Zealand  
  Norway Norway  Norway 
  Sweden   Sweden 
  Switzerland   Switzerland 
UK      
 USA   USA  
Countries that are missing from this table do so because they either score “medium” or “low” on the stratification index, not 
qualifying within any welfare-state regime. 
 
There are however countries that are left un-categorized for two reasons: adhering 
to different typologies regarding de-commodification and stratification (Belgium, 
Canada, Ireland) or having too low scores on the indexes measuring stratification 
which left them without a categorization on the stratification analysis (Germany, 
Italy, Japan, UK). Belgium’s score on the de-commodification index shares an 
equal distance to the socialist group as to the liberal, leaving it quite stabile as a 
conservative country if following the three-folded typology. Regarding 
stratification, it scores medium on the conservative on the margin on the number 
of occupationally distinct pension schemes as it has got five and not six, which 
would qualify for a higher score. By combining Belgium’s conservative position 
on the de-commodification index and stratification scoring indicates that Belgium 
could be categorized as a conservative country, although as it is not evident here, 
it is left with different answers on the two dimensions.   
Canada on the other hand has got a stabile position as scoring “high” on the 
liberal stratification index. The socialist scoring is a close cut as one of the 
variables (benefit universalism) is scored high on the margin. Moreover, regarding 
the de-commodification score, Canada is only 0.2 index points away from the 
country that scores highest in the liberal group. This might be an indication that 
Canada adheres to the liberal typology and not conservative, as it does in 2010. 
This problem might lie in the structuring of the de-commodification typology: that 
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the de-commodification scoring is divided into three equally large groups which 
represent the typology. Thus, there is a relational categorization where the 
countries position is decided depending on the other countries index level, not its 
own, creating a predesigned model of six countries in each cluster. If there was a 
limit for what is considered as high, medium or low de-commodification, as is 
done with the stratification index, the result might reflect the clustering differently 
and closer to the clustering in the stratification analysis. However, if following the 
original scoring metric, Canada as well as Belgium scores differently on the two 
dimensions stratification and de-commodification.  
There is another country that scores differently on the two dimensions. Ireland 
scores the top score on the socialist index, but illustrates one of the lowest levels 
of de-commodification in 2000, thus adhering to the liberal de-commodification 
group. There is no question regarding the scoring in Ireland’s case. But, if 
comparing with the result from 2010, Ireland scores one of the highest de-
commodification scores and the top score on the socialist stratification index. The 
results may illustrate a movement towards a consolidated socialist welfare-state 
regime in 2010 where it in 2000 already qualified as a socialist stratifier, but not 
de-commodifier. 
As stated, there are four countries that have too low scores on all three 
stratification indexes, leaving them uncategorized: Germany, Italy, Japan and the 
United Kingdom. The theory fails to explain why certain countries do not adhere 
to any certain index. Esping-Andersen explains that there might be hybrids, but 
does not explain what a hybrid welfare-state regime might be in this theoretical 
concept (cf. 1990, pp.73-75). Table 4.3.2 illustrates the findings in “Three 
Worlds”. As visible in table 4.3.2, there is also in Esping-Andersen’s analysis 
three countries that have too low scores on the stratification index to be 
categorized: Ireland, New Zealand and United Kingdom.  
 
Table 4.3.2 Country clustering, from “Three Worlds” 
Esping-Andersen, De-commodification 1980  Stratification 1980 
Conservative Liberal Socialist Conservative Liberal Socialist 
 Australia   Australia  
  Austria Austria   
  Belgium Belgium   
 Canada   Canada  
  Denmark   Denmark 
Finland     Finland 
France   France   
Germany   Germany   
 Ireland  . . . 
Italy   Italy   
Japan    Japan  
  Netherlands   Netherlands 
 New Zealand  . . . 
  Norway   Norway 
  Sweden   Sweden 
Switzerland    Switzerland  
 UK  . . . 
 USA   USA  
Countries that are missing from this table do so because they either score “medium” or “low” on the 
stratification index, not qualifying within any welfare-state regime.  
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In “Three Worlds” there are ten countries that can be categorized in the same 
regime type both on de-commodification and stratification: Australia (liberal), 
Canada (liberal), Denmark (socialist), France (conservative), Germany 
(conservative), Italy (conservative), Netherlands (socialist), Norway (socialist), 
Sweden (socialist) and USA (liberal). Concluding, there are thus five countries 
that qualify under different typologies: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Japan and 
Switzerland.  
The results from “Three Worlds” reminds of the one for year 2000 in that 
there are approximately ten countries that can be categorized, five that qualify 
under different typologies and three that have too low stratification scores. 
However, to which typology each country belongs to varies over time. The 
countries that remains the same in 2000 compared to 1980 are: Australia (liberal), 
Denmark (socialist), France (conservative), Netherlands (socialist), Norway 
(socialist), Sweden (socialist) and USA (liberal). When comparing the countries 
that belonged to the same typology for 20 years, it is only Sweden that has left its 
previous typology when moving into the 21
st
 century, to year 2010. 
 
 Table 4.3.3 Country Clustering (2010) 
De-commodification 2010   Stratification 2010 
Conservative Liberal Socialist Conservative Liberal Socialist 
 Australia   Australia  
Austria   Austria   
  Belgium   Belgium 
 Canada   Canada Canada 
  Denmark   Denmark 
Finland   Finland   
France   France  France 
 Germany     
  Ireland   Ireland 
 Italy     
Japan      
  Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands 
 New Zealand   New Zealand  
  Norway Norway  Norway 
Sweden      
  Switzerland   Switzerland 
 UK    UK 
 USA   USA  
Countries that are missing from this table do so because they either score “medium” or “low” on the 
stratification index, not qualifying within any welfare-state regime. 
 
Table 4.3.3 illustrates the de-commodification and stratification for year 2010. 
Visible is that, there are thirteen countries that can be categorized into one and the 
same typology: Australia (liberal), Austria (conservative), Belgium (socialist) 
Canada (liberal), Denmark (socialist), Finland (conservative), France 
(conservative), Ireland (socialist), Netherlands (socialist), New Zealand (liberal), 
Norway (socialist), Switzerland (socialist) and USA (liberal). When comparing 
with year 2000 there are a slight difference as Belgium and Ireland now can be 
categorized as socialist, while Canada can be categorized as liberal.  
On the other hand, Sweden has moved away from the socialist typology it 
belonged to in Esping-Andersen’s study and in 2000: the de-commodification 
level has decreased into a medium level while the socialist stratification index has 
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decreased, leaving Sweden without categorization on the stratification axis. 
Regarding de-commodification, it is the coverage rates that have decreased 
significantly in Sweden while the other variables remain unchanged. The decrease 
in coverage rates also is mirrored in the socialist stratification index, where it is 
the average coverage rates that represent one of the measures, leading to an index 
decrease. Other countries that have too low scores on the stratification index are 
Germany, Italy and Japan – the same as in 2000. 
The only country in 2010 that qualifies under different typologies on both 
dimensions is United Kingdom. Compared to 2000, United Kingdom has moved 
from a conservative level of de-commodification to a liberal, while the 
stratification analysis reveals the country as a socialist welfare-state regime. The 
results for United Kingdom thus stand ambiguous.  
When combining the de-commodification and stratification analysis conducted 
in this study, there is an evident pattern of countries clustering within the same 
typology on both a de-commodification and stratification axis in one year and 
over time. There is however question marks as some countries tend never to be 
defined within a stratification index, some countries qualifies under multiple 
stratification indexes and the question of whether de-commodification should be 
regarded relationally between countries. In the next chapter, there will be a 
discussion regarding the methodology, the replication results and reflections on 
whether these results support the three-folded welfare-state typology.  
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5 Are There Still “Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism”?  
The previous sections has presented the theoretical background of the seminal 
work “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990), the 
methodological discussion of doing a reproduction in a 21
st
 century context and 
the results. This section is intended as a discussion of the study conducted in this 
thesis, in order to discuss whether one could draw some general conclusions.  
Firstly, it is important to note the methodological impact on the results. The 
coverage rates do play a big role in the analysis, both for the de-commodification 
and stratification analysis. As de-commodification scores are weighted with 
coverage rates it favors countries with a high coverage rate and low de-
commodification scores, while disfavoring countries with high scores and a low 
coverage rates (cf. Bambra 2006). But as Esping-Andersen contrasts it, countries 
with high replacement rate but low percentage of the population covered, should 
not be considered as high de-commodifiers (1990, p.49). However, Australia (and 
New Zealand) is scored with a 50 % coverage rate instead of its actual 100 
percent (see Appendix for coverage rates). Esping-Andersen chooses this scoring 
metric as Australia and New Zealand’s social security programs are means-tested. 
If Australia and New Zealand would not have this negative scoring, they would be 
at the top of the de-commodification scale instead of at the bottom. However, 
when one look at section 4.3 where both de-commodification and stratification 
clustering are compared, both Australia and New Zealand are considered as 
coherent liberal welfare states, belonging to this grouping on both axis and both of 
the studied years. Therefore, the negative scoring might place them in the cluster 
that they belong. But, as coverage rates impact on the socialist index as well, a 
removal of the negative scoring would place New Zealand and Australia as both 
high de-commodifiers and socialist stratifiers. The cases of Australia and New 
Zealand well illustrates the impact of the methodology on the results and it would 
need a further analysis to see whether the negative scoring place these countries 
truthfully as liberal countries or as social democratic.  
Besides the evident impact of coverage rates, the overall methodology, and 
thus the result, is very sensitive to alteration. In more than one case, especially 
regarding de-commodification scores, there are countries very close to the cutting 
points of two different scores. In this analysis, I chose to strictly use the cutting 
points, while others (e.g. Scruggs and Allan 2006) thought it better to include the 
country when close to a cutting point as they considered it closer to that range 
than the other. It could even be a matter of rounding off wrongly, leaving the 
country in a different position. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see as a researcher 
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why a country should be labeled as one score when it is only a 0.02 difference to 
another score and when the scoring has got such an impact on the result.  
It is especially difficult to see why Esping-Andersen chooses no cutting points 
for the final de-commodification index when cutting points otherwise are used 
during the entire analysis. In the stratification analysis he offers an explanation 
why countries are labeled as belonging to a certain cluster: if they score high on 
one index and medium and low on the others, they belong to that cluster. But 
when it comes to the de-commodification analysis, countries are ranked according 
to the de-commodification index and divided into three groups with six countries 
in each. What is well in “Three Worlds” is that the clustering matches his 
theoretical typology almost perfectly. But when conducting a reproduction today, 
can one really rely on the fact that the cutting points are decided due to the 
number of countries and not on their actual positioning? There is no problem with 
the ranking of the de-commodification index as the countries inter-relational 
position is interesting and illustrates well how countries change over time. 
However, by only allowing for an analysis based on the countries inter-relational 
positioning and not on how they are performing in absolute numbers is 
problematic. There is no obvious cutting point when a country is considered as a 
high/medium/low de-commodifier, but if such metric were to be used, it would 
facilitate for cross-temporal comparative research when clustering does not 
depend on the count of six countries in each cluster. 
Regarding the results then, if one accepts the methodological and theoretical 
bearings of “Three Worlds”, hence this replication study, there is surprisingly an 
even greater coherence of clustering in this study than the one in “Three Worlds”. 
This argument is based on section 4.3 where the combined de-commodification 
and stratification clustering is presented for year 2000, 2010 and Esping-
Andersen’s 1980’s analysis. In “Three Worlds” there are ten out of eighteen 
countries that can be stated as belonging to the same cluster in both the de-
commodification and stratification analysis, whereas it in the replication study for 
year 2000 are eleven countries and in 2010 thirteen countries. Bearing in mind 
that Esping-Andersen’s study and the replication results in this study are based on 
different databases and that result can vary due to this fact, it seems as if the 
regime clustering is becoming clearer over time. At least, the crystallization is 
visible when comparing the replication results for year 2000 and 2010. 
Besides the fact that the clustering is more evident today, there are other 
interesting results regarding different countries positions, e.g. Sweden’s move 
from an archetypical social democratic country, Italy’s constant decrease in de-
commodification ranking and Ireland’s dramatic de-commodification increase. 
Most notably is that Sweden’s position as the archetypical social democratic 
country has changed in the 2010 analysis. In all previous reproductions Sweden 
and USA were the only countries that consistently, in every analysis, belonged to 
the same cluster (cf. Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). USA still is considered as 
liberal in both 2000 and 2010 and Sweden in 2000 still is considered as social 
democratic on both dimensions. In 2010 on the other hand, Sweden has reduced 
its de-commodification index to a medium level and has got too low scores to 
belong to any stratification index. Another example of a country that illustrates 
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ambiguous results is Netherlands, which in 2010 score high on all stratification 
indexes, but as it score high on the de-commodification index is categorized as 
social democratic. Esping-Andersen calls Netherlands the “Janus-headed” welfare 
state as it de-commodifies highly when regarding income maintenance but still is 
characterized by a family oriented welfare state (1999, pp.87-88). In the 
reproduction analysis in this study, Netherlands thus scores high on all 
stratification indexes leaving it with three welfare-state regimes faces instead of 
two.  
In contrast with the Netherlands, there are countries that fail to qualify as 
belonging to any stratification index. As I can see it, there are five possible 
explanations to why countries fails to be categorized under any of the 
stratification indexes:, 1.The countries are in a transitioning phase: developing 
from one regime type to another, 2.The variables in the stratification indexes are 
too few, not measuring the variation to a full extent, 3.Hybrids: the countries 
represents a mixture of different welfare-state regimes, 4.There is an additional 
welfare-state regime, making the typology not exhaustive nor exclusive, 5.As the 
theory does not explain all cases, it is falsified. From this study, it is impossible to 
say whether which one of these possible outcomes explains the uncategorized 
countries. However, Esping-Andersen and others do recognize hybrid regimes in 
the “real world” that does not fit into the ideal-typical categories. In Sweden’s 
case, it is possible to say that the country is in a transitioning phase as there is 
evident that something has changed both on a de-commodification and 
stratification level. As there are only two to three variables measuring each 
stratification index, there is a possibility that the indexes do not cover the full 
ideological variation, thus leaving countries uncategorized. A few additional 
variables might be preferable, and is a suggestion for further research. As there 
are countries that fails to be categorized on a stratification axis, on cannot deny 
the fact that there might be additional typologies, although it might as well be the 
case of hybrids as an incorrect typology. The last possible explanation, that the 
uncategorized countries falsify the theory is difficult to see as the investigation 
finds strong evidence that welfare state do cluster according to the ideal types, 
although there still are some unexplained cases. Therefore, the theory testing that 
this study set out to do, provide for evidence that the typology is still relevant in a 
21
st
 century context. However, as welfare states that earlier were considered as 
belonging to one cluster, now belongs to another, the ideological labeling of each 
cluster is debatable. Nonetheless, the fact that welfare states do cluster according 
to the concepts stratification and de-commodification is evident. To answer 
question, yes – capitalist welfare states still consist of “the Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly” in the 21st century, and actually even more so than in the 1980’s.  
5.1 Future research 
In the previous section, there have already been a few suggestions for further 
research: developing the stratification index to incorporate more variables and to 
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develop an indicator for the de-commodification index when a country is 
considered as social democratic/conservative/liberal. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to look into the individual cases to see what has inspired the rapid 
changes: the de-commodification decreasing countries; Denmark, Germany and 
Sweden, and the de-commodification increasing; Belgium, Ireland and Japan. 
Also, it would be interesting and perhaps theoretically fruitful to investigate the 
countries that fail to be categorized, in order to see whether there might be 
additional ideal-types that the theory fails to discover. Another interesting future 
research project would be to incorporate countries outside the “capitalist” 
countries as there may be other welfare-state regimes outside the OECD area.   
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6 Executive Summary 
This thesis departs from a seminal work in comparative welfare state research: 
“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” by Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990). In 
“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, Esping-Andersen illustrated that there 
are three ideal-types of welfare states in the capitalist world: social democratic, 
liberal and conservative welfare-state regimes. What Esping-Andersen did that 
was so unique was to illustrate that the empirical world of welfare states was 
actually clustering into these different theoretical typologies and not 
acknowledging welfare states as unique cases. The purpose of this thesis is to 
reproduce the study conducted by Esping-Andersen in his seminal work in order 
to see whether there are still three clusters of welfare-state regimes in the 
capitalist countries or whether the welfare regime climate has shifted since the 
1980’s (data in “Three Worlds” was from 1980). The research questions for this 
study reads:  
 
 Today, is there still a cluster of three welfare-state regimes in the 18 
studied countries? 
 How, and in what respect have the welfare states internal structure 
changed over the last decade, using Esping-Andersen’s definition of a 
welfare-state regime? 
 Does the result support or falsify the three-folded typology, in a 21st 
century context?  
 
Esping-Andersen developed a definition of how welfare states are structured 
with the concepts de-commodification and stratification. This definition of a 
welfare-state  regime is used in this study as an indicator of how welfare states 
have developed during the 21
st
 century and thus whether there still is a three-
folded welfare-state regime clustering. In “The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism”, Esping-Andersen “re-specifies the welfare state” using the concept 
of welfare-state regimes. In this sense he avoids what he calls a narrow concept: 
“[…] the concept of the welfare state is to narrowly associated with the 
conventional social-amelioration policies” (1990, p.2). 
The welfare-state regimes are defined as a combination of de-commodification 
and stratification. De-commodification is a term sprung from the workers position 
in society. Industrialism and capitalism brought about a change in the labor 
market, where workers now were seen as commodities and “[…] their survival 
was contingent upon the sale of their labor power” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.21). 
In opposition to the market, the state is considered as the “de-commodifier” as it 
introduces social rights and lets individuals lead their lives without relying 
entirely on the market (ibid., pp.21-22). Stratification on the other hand refers to 
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the welfare state as a “system of stratification”, which in turn refers to the 
redistributive characteristics of the welfare state. Different welfare systems affect 
the stratification of society in different ways, either to a more egalitarian level, or 
by cementing class-structures (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.55). There are three 
measures for welfare-state regime stratification: conservative, liberal and social 
democratic. For the conservative welfare-state regimes, the traditional societal 
class model is a prevalent idea, but also the rejection of capitalism. Liberal 
stratification sees the state and the stratified society were as something that had 
gotten in the way of market emancipation, and in extension, individual liberty, 
which is the focus. The most important notion of socialism was to change the 
societal stratification and achieve social leveling. 
To investigate welfare state development in the 21
st
 century, and compare with 
the findings Esping-Andersen made in “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” this 
study will be conducted as a replication. Therefore, the studied countries are 
identical, the method and scoring metric as well. However, not all data that 
Esping-Andersen used is available, additional sources and thus operationalization 
will be used. The studied countries consist of 18 OECD members: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and the United States. This thesis will thus be designed as a cross-
temporal comparative welfare research study, using the definition of a welfare-
state regime made by Esping-Andersen in “The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism”, using the same countries, with an operationalization that differs to 
some extent. In order to see whether welfare-state regimes have shifted during the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century, the study consists of a comparison between two 
time periods: year 2000 and 2010. The data that is used for de-commodification is 
gathered from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED2, Scruggs 
et.al., 2013). The data for stratification is gathered from the OECD databases and 
“Social Security Programs throughout the World” (Social Security 
Administration, USA). 
De-commodification is measured for pension, sickness- and unemployment 
insurances. The variables that measure the de-commodification level for these 
insurances are replacement rates, insurance duration, qualification for insurance 
and waiting days before benefits are paid. The scoring is designed for each 
country, for each of the three social security systems: pension unemployment and 
sickness benefits; consisting of the described variables. All variables are scored 1-
3 depending on their relation to the mean; countries with a de-commodification 
index-score one standard deviation above the mean are labeled the number 3, and 
more than one standard deviation below the mean as 1. The countries that scored 
2, are thus the medium “de-commodifying” countries, and are those that are less 
than one standard deviation above and less than one standard deviation below the 
mean. The mean is computed after deleting outliers. After each variable has got a 
score, the added score for each insurance is computed. Then, the insurance scores 
are weighted by the insurance coverage. Lastly, the weighted score are combined 
into one de-commodification index and countries are ranked accordingly. High 
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scores indicate a social democratic welfare-state regime, medium score a 
conservative, low scores a liberal. 
Stratification is measured according to three indexes: conservatism, liberalism 
and socialism. The conservative index is measured as to the degree of corporatism 
(number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes) and degree of etatism 
(compensation to government employees as a percentage of total expenditure). 
The liberal index measures the number of means-tested benefit systems, private 
pension expenditure and private health expenditure. Lastly, the socialist index 
measures average benefit universalism (average coverage of sickness-, 
unemployment insurances and pensions) and benefit equality (the ratio of 
minimum to standard pension benefits). The idea for having three different 
indexes is to illustrate how countries that belong to a certain cluster scores high in 
that cluster, and then scores low on the other two indexes. Each variable for each 
index is given the score 0, 2 or 4 depending on how they qualify (see section 3.2 
for details). There are two used in this study that are quite different from the one 
in “There Worlds”, and then the same scoring cannot be applied. Instead a similar 
scoring to the de-commodification index is used, where the mean and standard 
deviation is computed; 0 if one standard deviation below the mean, 2 if one 
standard deviation within the mean, and 4 if one standard deviation above the 
mean.  
The results for de-commodification and stratification are presented separately 
for each year. There are northern European countries found at the top of the de-
commodification scale in 2000: Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, 
Sweden and Germany. The “conservative” group consists of France, Finland, 
Belgium, Austria, United Kingdom and Canada. While liberal group consists 
Italy, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, USA and Australia.  
In 2010 Norway is now the top de-commodifying country, followed by the 
Netherlands. Other countries that illustrate high levels of de-commodification are 
Belgium, Switzerland, Ireland and Denmark. Moving on to the countries with a 
more modest level of de-commodification, one can find France, Japan, Sweden, 
Finland, Austria and Germany. The countries that remain in this category since 
year 2000 are France, Finland and Austria of which had none or a minor change in 
actual de-commodification level and ranking. The newcomers are thus Japan, 
Sweden and Germany. The group with the lowest level of de-commodification is 
represented by Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, New Zealand, USA and Australia. 
New Zealand, USA and Australia remains consistently in the bottom three, for the 
year 2000, 2010 and in Esping-Andersen’s study leaving them to be the most 
consistent group of them all. 
Regarding the stratification analysis for year 2000, four countries qualify as 
conservative: Austria, Finland, France and Norway. Those that score “high“ on 
the liberal index are Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Netherlands and USA. 
Countries that score “high” on the socialist index are Denmark, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, France, Norway and Sweden. 
However, Germany, Italy and Japan do not score “high” on either of the indexes, 
making this group of countries unable to be categorized in accordance with the 
theory. 
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The stratification analysis for year 2010 shows an almost identical clustering 
at the top of each index if compared with the analysis for year 2000. The countries 
that are considered as conservative are: Finland, Norway, Austria, France and 
Netherlands. The liberal index consists of the same countries as in 2000: 
Australia, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand and USA. The only difference is 
that New Zealand has reduced its score by one step, mirroring a drop in private 
health expenditure. The socialist index does also remind of the one from 2000, 
with Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Norway and United Kingdom at the top. Also for year 2010, there are some 
countries that are failing to be categorized according to the theory. Germany, Italy 
and Japan are still scoring only “medium” or “low” on all of the indexes. The 
difference is that Sweden now adheres to this group of “low-scorers”. Moreover, 
Canada, France, Netherlands and Norway still score “high” on two indexes with 
the difference that Netherlands in 2010 score “high” on three indexes instead of 
two. 
In the last part of the analysis, de-commodification and stratification for each 
year are analyzed separately in order to see whether there are clusters and whether 
they are fixed or fluent over time. In 2000 there are eleven countries that adheres 
to the same typology on a de-commodification and stratification axis: Australia 
(liberal), Austria (conservative), Denmark (socialist), Finland (conservative), 
France (conservative), Netherlands (socialist), New Zealand (liberal), Norway 
(socialist), Sweden (socialist), Switzerland (socialist) and USA (liberal).  
In “Three Worlds” there are ten countries that can be categorized in the same 
regime type both on de-commodification and stratification: Australia (liberal), 
Canada (liberal), Denmark (socialist), France (conservative), Germany 
(conservative), Italy (conservative), Netherlands (socialist), Norway (socialist), 
Sweden (socialist) and USA (liberal). Concluding, there are thus five countries 
that qualify under different typologies: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Japan and 
Switzerland.  
The results from “Three Worlds” reminds of the one for year 2000. However, 
to which typology each country belongs to varies over time. The seven countries 
that remains the same in 2000 compared to 1980 and they are: Australia (liberal), 
Denmark (socialist), France (conservative), Netherlands (socialist), Norway 
(socialist), Sweden (socialist) and USA (liberal). When comparing the countries 
that belonged to the same typology for 20 years, it is only Sweden that has left its 
previous typology when moving into the 21
st
 century, to year 2010. 
There are thirteen countries that can be categorized into one and the same 
typology in 2010: Australia (liberal), Austria (conservative), Belgium (socialist) 
Canada (liberal), Denmark (socialist), Finland (conservative), France 
(conservative), Ireland (socialist), Netherlands (socialist), New Zealand (liberal), 
Norway (socialist), Switzerland (socialist) and USA (liberal). When comparing 
with year 2000 there are a slight difference as Belgium and Ireland now can be 
categorized as socialist, while Canada can be categorized as liberal. 
Conclusion: The theory testing that this study set out to do, provide for 
evidence that the typology is still relevant in a 21
st
 century context. The results 
illustrate an even more consistent clustering than in “Three Worlds”. However, as 
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welfare states that earlier were considered as belonging to one cluster, now 
belongs to another, the ideological background of each cluster is debatable. 
Nonetheless, the fact that welfare states do cluster according to the concepts 
stratification and de-commodification is evident. 
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8 Appendix 
 
8.1 Variable Oversight 
Table 8.1 Variable Oversight 
Variable Description Year Source 
Country Country name 2000, 2010 CWED2 
Year Year (2000, 2010) 2000, 2010 CWED2 
APWW Average production worker wage: 
calculated for a fictive manufacturing 
worker who is 40 years old and has 
worked for 20 years. Including all cash 
transfers from general government. 
Using the same definition as OECD’s 
“take-home pay”. The basis for 
calculating replacement rates. 
CWED2 
US100 Unemployment insurance 
replacement rate, single worker 
(100%). Replacement rates are 
calculated for a fictive average 
production worker in the 
manufacturing sector who is 40 years 
old and has been working for 20 years. 
Assumptions: 1. Unemployed for 6 
months, 2.20 years of insurance, 
3.Blue Collar worker, 4. Involuntary 
unemployment., 5.Full time worker, 
6.Full time benefit. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
UEQUAL Unemployment insurance qualification 
period: Weeks of insurance needed to 
qualify for benefit. Period corresponds 
to insurance period necessary to 
receive benefit accruing to the 
fictional worker described above. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
UEDUR Unemployment insurance duration: 
Weeks of benefit entitlement 
excluding time series of means-tested 
assistance. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
UEWAIT Unemployment insurance waiting 
days: Days one must wait to start 
receiving benefits after becoming 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
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unemployed. 
UECOV Unemployment insurance coverage: 
percentage of the labor force insured 
for unemployment risk, NOT the 
percentage of currently unemployed 
or currently receiving benefits. 
2000, 2010. Data missing for 
Belgium, France and 
Switzerland in 2010, using 
2009 data instead. For Italy, 
last data was from 1980. 
Growth rates were 
computed to calculate a 
coverage rate.[1] Japan 
2008 instead of 2010. 
CWED2 
SS100 Sickness insurance replacement rate, 
single worker (100%). Replacement 
rates are calculated for a fictive 
average production worker in the 
manufacturing sector who is 40 years 
old and has been working for 20 years. 
Sickness insurance type is assumed to 
be involuntary common cold/flu. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
SICKQUAL Sickness insurance qualification 
period: Weeks of insurance needed to 
qualify for benefit. Period corresponds 
to insurance period necessary to 
receive benefit accruing to the 
fictional worker described above. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
SICKDUR Sickness insurance duration: Weeks of 
benefit entitlement excluding times of 
means-tested assistance or long-term 
disability/invalidity pensions. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
SICKWAIT Sickness insurance waiting days: Days 
one must wait to start receiving 
benefits after becoming sick. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
SICKCOV Sickness insurance coverage: 
percentage of the labor force insured 
for sickness risk, NOT the percentage 
of currently sick or currently receiving 
benefits. 
2000, 2010. Data missing for 
Belgium, Ireland and 
Netherlands in 2010, using 
2009 instead. France 2006 
instead of 2010. Japan 2007 
instead of 2010. 
CWED2 
MPS100 Minimum pension replacement rate, 
single worker (100%). Calculated as if 
worker retires when 65 years old (or 
the legal retirement age) and do not 
qualify for an earnings related 
pension. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
SPS100 Standard pension replacement rate, 
single worker (100%). Calculated as if 
worker retires when 65 years old (or 
the legal retirement age), based on 
average production worker wage 
(APWW), working from age 20. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
PQUAL “Standard” number of years of 
pension insurance to be fully covered. 
2000, 2010 CWED2 
PFUND The ratio of employee contributions to 
employer and employee pension 
contributions. 
2000, 2010. Data was 
missing for Ireland 2000, 
therefore data for 1999 was 
CWED2 
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used. 
PENCOV Coverage/Pension take-up rate: 
Portion of those above official 
retirement age who are in receipt of a 
public pension. 
2000, 2010. Data missing for 
Italy, Netherlands and USA 
2010, using 2009 instead. 
Japan 2007 instead of 2010. 
UK 2008 instead of 2010. 
Latest value for Austria, 
Germany and Sweden was 
2003, growth rates 
computed with earlier 
values, calculating coverage 
rates for 2010. 
CWED2 
Corporatism Degree of corporatism: measured as 
the number of occupationally distinct 
public pension schemes. 
2002, 2010 for Europe and 
Asia. 2003, 2011 for the 
Americas. 
“Social Security 
Systems 
Throughout the 
World” (SSA) 
Etatism Compensation to government 
employees: share of expenditure to 
general government employees, 
percentage of GDP 
2000, 2010. Data missing for 
Australia and New Zealand, 
using data for 2001 and 
2011 instead. 
OECD “National 
Accounts at a 
glance” 
Means-test Number of means-tested social 
security programs. Calculated on 
whether a social security system is 
considered as means-testing or not. 
Based on ILO’s gathering of data. 
Variable: “Means-tested conditions for 
benefits”. Total numbers of systems 
are 8: sickness, maternity, old age, 
invalidity, survivors, family allowances, 
work injury and unemployment. 
2003, 2010 ILO, Social Security 
Database. 
PrivPen Share of private pension expenditure 
to total pension expenditure (public 
and private), %.  
2000, 2009. Data is missing 
for Japan and Ireland on 
both years! Both Norway 
and Switzerland is missing 
data for 2010, using 2008 
instead. Data missing for 
Denmark 2000, using 2001 
instead. Finland, France, 
Italy, Norway and Sweden 
are missing data for year 
2000. Growth rates are 
computed with later values 
creating a trend estimated 
value. Calculated the same 
way as UECOV. 
OECD Pension 
indicators 
PrivHealth Share of private health expenditure to 
total health expenditure (public and 
private), %. 
2001, 2011. Data missing for 
Netherlands for both years, 
values are trend estimated. 
OECD “Coverage for 
Health Care” in 
Health at a Glance. 
Universalism Average benefit universalism: average 
for sickness, unemployment insurance 
and pensions. Universalism measures 
the percentage of the relevant 
population (labor force) covered under 
the respective programs. Thus the 
average of: UECOV, SICKCOV, PENCOV. 
2000, 2010 (see each 
variable description for 
details) 
CWED2 
BenEq Pension benefit equality: Ratio of what 
a standard worker will receive as a 
minimum pension replacement rate in 
2000, 2010. CWED2 
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relation to the standard pension 
replacement rate (MPS100/SPS100), 
%. 
Comments: Growth rate for Italy’s sickness insurance was used in order to compute the coverage rate for the 
unemployment insurance for year 2000 and 2010 from 1980’s coverage rates, as 1980 was last data recorded. 
The sickness insurance was used when computing average growth rate as the trend with these two insurances 
are similar in movement in the other countries. Growth rates are thusly computed: ((growth rate today – 
growth rate yesterday) / growth rate yesterday) / number of years). 
Growth rates for Austria, Germany and Sweden were computed from earlier pension coverage rates, as rates 
were available until 2003. However, pension coverage rates are quite stable for all countries during the 
period, assuming a small or no change at all in pension take-up rates. But in order not to follow the pension 
coverage trend, growth rates were computed. Although the result was almost identical to the base year as 
growth rates were low. 
There is no data for France before 2009 therefore the value of 0.4 from 2009 represents the 2000 value as 
there are no values to estimate a trend. 0.4 % is a quite low figure, and as the share of private pensions has 
increased in all countries during the investigated period, it is somewhat safe to assume that values would not 
be higher than 0.4 and there is almost no room for it to be any lower. Therefore, 0.4 seems like the best 
estimate for France in 2000. 
 
8.2 Tables 
8.2.1 Tables: De-commodification 
Table 8.2.1.1 De-commodification data (2000) 
 Sickness   Unemployment  Pension 
Country Replacement 
rate (%) 
Qualifying 
period 
(weeks) 
Waiting 
(days) 
Duration 
limit 
(weeks) 
Replacement 
rate (%) 
Qualifying 
period 
(weeks) 
Waiting 
(days) 
Duration 
(weeks) 
Minimum 
replacement 
rate (%) 
Standard 
replacement 
rate (%) 
Qualifying 
period 
(years) 
Employee 
funding 
(%) 
Australia 27,5 (1) 0 (3) 7 (1) 999 (3) 27,5 (1) 0 (3) 7 (2) 999 (3) 30,9 (2) 30,9 (1) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Austria 72,2 (2) 780 (1) 3 (2) 60 (2) 54,7 (2) 312 (1) 0 (3) 39 (2) 48,5 (3) 84,6 (3) 45 (1) 45 (2) 
Belgium 84,9 (2) 26 (1) 1 (2) 52 (2) 62,9 (2) 78 (2) 0 (3) 999 (3) 40,7 (2) 69,5 (2) 35 (2) 46 (2) 
Canada 37,6 (2) 15 (1) 14 (1) 15 (2) 59,8 (2) 45 (2) 14 (1) 38 (2) 41,9 (2) 53,1 (2) 29 (3) 50 (2) 
Denmark 60,7 (2) 13 (1) 0 (3) 52 (2) 60,8 (2) 52 (2) 0 (3) 208 (3) 45,2 (3) 52,1 (2) 35 (2) 33 (2) 
Finland 74,4 (2) 0 (3) 7 (1) 50 (2) 58,4 (2) 43 (2) 7 (2) 100 (2) 31,5 (2) 62,1 (2) 40 (2) 19 (3) 
France 62,4 (2) 52 (1) 3 (2) 156 (3) 70,1 (2) 61 (2) 7 (2) 39 (2) 43 (2) 57,1 (2) 37,5 (2) 40 (2) 
Germany 89,5 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 78 (2) 60 (2) 104 (1) 0 (3) 52 (2) 18 (1) 73,3 (3) 45 (1) 50 (2) 
Ireland 27,6 (1) 260 (1) 3 (2) 999 (3) 27,7 (1) 39 (2) 3 (2) 65 (2) 31,8 (2) 35,8 (1) 19 (3) 31 (3) 
Italy 76,1 (2) 0 (3) 3 (2) 26 (2) 41,6 (2) 104 (1) 0 (3) 26 (2) 29,4 (2) 88,4 (3) 40 (2) 27 (3) 
Japan 60,7 (2) 0 (3) 3 (2) 26 (2) 62,9 (2) 1040 (1) 7 (2) 30 (2) 22,7 (1) 51,6 (2) 38 (2) 50 (2) 
Netherlands 80 (2) 0 (3) 0 (3) 52 (2) 78,5 (3) 1040 (1) 0 (3) 104 (3) 47,9 (3) 47,9 (2) 0 (3) 100 (1) 
New 
Zealand 
26,3 (1) 0 (3) 7 (1) 999 (3) 26,3 (1) 0 (3) 7 (2) 999 (3) 39,8 (2) 39,8 (1) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Norway 100 (3) 2 (2) 0 (3) 52 (2) 65,9 (2) 4 (3) 3 (2) 156 (3) 43,9 (2) 60,7 (2) 32 (2) 36 (2) 
Sweden 80,8 (2) 0 (3) 1 (2) 999 (3) 67 (2) 52 (2) 5 (2) 60 (2) 36,2 (2) 62,2 (2) 30 (2) 41 (2) 
Switzerland 100 (3) 1040 (1) 0 (3) 26 (2) 72,1 (3) 78 (2) 5 (2) 104 (3) 34,3 (2) 41,3 (2) 45 (1) 50 (2) 
UK 22 (1) 5 (2) 3 (2) 52 (2) 19 (1) 10 (3) 3 (2) 26 (2) 27,8 (2) 53,3 (2) 39 (2) 50 (2) 
USA 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 57,8 (2) 20 (2) 7 (2) 26 (2) 33,4 (2) 56,1 (2) 35 (2) 50 (2) 
             
Mean 60,15 4,36 2,41 49,79 56,12 46 4,17 61,79 35,94 56,66 36,30 41,20 
St.d. 29,637 8,006 2,551 36,787 15,9 34,949 3,869 39,678 8,577 15,479 6,979 9,987 
Cutting 
points 
30/89 0/12,4 0/5 13/87 40/72 11/86 1/8 22/101 27,3/44,5 41,2/72 29,3/43 31,2/51 
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Inverted scoring as a higher qualification period represents a lower level of de-commodification. This is also done with 
variables indicating waiting days and employee funding. 
De-commodification scores 1-3 within parenthesis, where 3 represent the highest level of de-commodification. 
Numbers in bold indicate a close cut between different de-commodification scores. 
Although a few states have got sick pay programs, there are no national in United States, resulting in no de-
commodification scores regarding sickness insurances (CWED Codebook, p.113). 
 
Table 8.2.1.2 Insurance coverage rates (2000) 
Country Sickness Insurance 
 Coverage (%) 
Unemployment Insurance  
Coverage (%) 
Pension Take-up Rate  
(%) 
Australia 50 (100) 50 (100) 50  (65,4) 
Austria 82 86 87 
Belgium 98 85 101 
Canada 79 82 99 
Denmark 99 83 101 
Finland 100 74 100 
France 100 87 100 
Germany 90 86 100 
Ireland 101 101 98 
Italy 64 44,6 99 
Japan 58 59 126 
Netherlands 89 89 107 
New Zealand 50 (100) 50 (100) 95 
Norway 100 92 102 
Sweden 95 86 105 
Switzerland 100 96 100 
UK 88 88 104 
USA 0 92 93 
Mean 84,88 79,48 98,17 
St.d. 18,262 16,891 14,267 
Australian and New Zealand coverage rates are set at 50 % due to the scoring in “Three Worlds”. Actual coverage rates are 
within parenthesis. 
 
Table 8.2.1.3 De-commodification Scores (2000) 
Country Sickness  Unemployment Pension De-commodification index 
Australia 4,5 5 6 15,5 
Austria 7,38 8,6 13,05 29,03 
Belgium 8,82 10,2 10,44 29,46 
Canada 6,32 7,38 12,87 26,57 
Denmark 9,9 10,79 14,14 34,83 
Finland 10 7,4 13 30,4 
France 10 8,7 12 30,7 
Germany 12,6 8,6 11 32,2 
Ireland 7,07 8,08 10,78 25,93 
Italy 7,04 4,46 14,85 26,35 
Japan 6,38 5,31 12,6 24,29 
Netherlands 10,68 11,57 14,98 37,23 
New Zealand 4,5 5 11,94 20,9 
Norway 13 11,04 12,24 36,28 
Sweden 11,4 8,6 12,6 32,6 
Switzerland 12 12,48 11 35,48 
UK 7,04 7,92 12,48 27,44 
USA 0 9,2 11,16 20,36 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.2.1.4 De-commodification data (2010) 
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Sickness    Unemployment  Pension 
Country Replacem
ent rate 
(%) 
Qualify
ing 
period 
(weeks
) 
Waitin
g 
(days) 
Duratio
n Limit 
(weeks
) 
Replac
ement 
rate 
(%) 
Qualifyin
g period 
(weeks) 
Waitin
g 
(days) 
Duration 
(weeks) 
Minimum 
replacem
ent rate 
(%) 
Standa
rd 
replace
ment 
rate 
(%) 
Qualifyin
g period 
(years) 
Employee 
funding (%) 
Australia 22,8 (1) 0 (3) 7 (1) 999 (3) 27,5 (1) 0 (3) 7 (2) 999 (3) 34,6 (2) 34,6 (1) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Austria 88,2 (2) 780 (1) 3 (2) 62 (2) 55 (2) 312 (1) 0 (3) 39 (2) 49,6 (3) 82,9 (3) 45 (1) 45 (2) 
Belgium 83 (2) 26 (1) 1 (2) 52 (2) 67,3 (2) 78 (2) 0 (3) 999 (3) 52,7 (3) 76 (3) 35 (2) 46 (2) 
Canada 36,5 (2) 15 (1) 14 (1) 15 (1) 55,8 (2) 45 (2) 14 (1) 42 (2) 40,1 (2) 54,5 (2) 37 (2) 50 (2) 
Denmark 56,4 (2) 13 (1) 0 (3) 52 (2) 56,4 (2) 52 (2) 0 (3) 104 (3) 45,8 (2) 53,1 (2) 40 (2) 33 (2) 
Finland 71,4 (2) 0 (3) 10 (1) 50 (2) 56,5 (2) 34 (2) 7 (2) 100 (3) 27 (1) 68,3 (2) 40 (2) 21 (3) 
France 63,7 (2) 52 (1) 3 (2) 156 (3) 70,8 (2) 104 (1) 7 (2) 104 (3) 44,5 (2) 55,6 (2) 40,5 (2) 40 (2) 
Germany 87,9 (2) 0 (3) 0 (3) 78 (2) 60 (2) 104 (1) 0 (3) 52 (2) 18,5 (1) 63,5 (2) 45 (1) 50 (2) 
Ireland 36,3 (2) 260 (1) 3 (2) 104 (3) 39,4 (1) 260 (1) 3 (2) 52 (2) 46,6 (2) 48,9 (2) 29 (3) 34 (2) 
Italy 76,6  (2) 0 (3) 3 (2) 26 (2) 55 (2) 104 (1) 0 (3) 35 (1) 28,7 (2) 84 (3) 40 (2) 27 (3) 
Japan 68,5 (2) 0 (3) 3 (2) 26 (2) 57,7 (2) 1040 (1) 7 (2) 21 (1) 23,4 (1) 53,3 (2) 40 (2) 50 (2) 
Netherland
s 
85,9 (2) 0 (3) 0 (3) 104 (3) 83 (3) 1040 (1) 0 (3) 90 (2) 51,8 (3) 51,8 (2) 0 (3) 100 (1) 
New 
Zealand 
24,5 (1) 0 (3) 7 (1) 999 (3) 24,5 (1) 0 (3) 7 (2) 999 (3) 40,2 (2) 39,8 (1) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Norway 100 (3) 4 (2) 0 (3) 52 (2) 66,8 (2) 4 (3) 3 (2) 104 (3) 52,6 (3) 67,9 (2) 40 (2) 36 (2) 
Sweden 79,4 (2) 0 (3) 1 (2) 999 (3) 61,7 (2) 52 (2) 7 (2) 60 (2) 31,1 (2) 53,3 (2) 30 (3) 41 (2) 
Switzerland 100 (3) 1040 
(1) 
0 (3) 26 (2) 72,6 (3) 52 (2) 5 (2) 80 (2) 33,2 (2) 38,6 (1) 45 (1) 50 (2) 
UK 21,4 (1) 6 (2) 3 (2) 52 (2) 17,2 (1) 12 (2) 3 (2) 26 (1) 34,7 (2) 58,1 (2) 45 (1) 50 (2) 
USA 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 58,7 (2) 20 (2) 7 (2) 99 (3) 31,7 (2) 59,1 (2) 35 (2) 50 (2) 
             
Mean 61,25 4,57 2,13 57 56,71 47,21 4,28 67,20 38,16 57,96 39,10 41,53 
St.d. 30,365 7,998 2,335 40,294 15,594 38,407 3,923 31,221 10,499 13,971 5,128 9,478 
Cutting 
points 
31/91,6 0/12,6 0/4,5 17/97 41/72,3 9/87 0/8 36/98 27,7/48,6 44/72 34/44 32/51 
Inverted scoring as a higher qualification period represents a lower level of de-commodification. This is also done with 
variables indicating waiting days and employee funding. 
De-commodification scores 1-3, where 3 represent the highest level of de-commodification. 
Numbers in bold indicate a close cut between different de-commodification scores. 
Although a few states have got sick pay programs, there are no national in United States, resulting in no de-
commodification scores regarding sickness insurances (CWED Codebook, p.113). 
 
Table 8.2.1.5 Insurance coverage rates (2010) 
Country Sickness Insurance 
 Coverage (%) 
Unemployment Insurance  
Coverage (%) 
Pension Take-up Rate  
(%) 
Australia 50 (100) 50 (100) 50 (72) 
Austria 84 86 82 
Belgium 100 86 102 
Canada 78 82 99 
Denmark 100 71 102 
Finland 100 74 100 
France 100 87 100 
Germany 83 76 97 
Ireland 102 102 116 
Italy 69 48,2 85 
Japan 60 63 190 
Netherlands 87 86 111 
New Zealand 50 (100) 50 (100) 100 
Norway 100 92 103 
Sweden 87 68 100 
Switzerland 100 98 100 
UK 84 84 109 
USA 0 85 95 
    
Mean 84,35 77,12 102,28 
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St.d. 17,723 16,055 26,083 
Australian and New Zealand coverage rates are set at 50 % due to the scoring in “Three Worlds”. Actual coverage rates are 
within parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 8.2.1.6 De-commodification Scores (2010) 
Country Sickness  Unemployment Pension De-commodification  
index 
Australia 4,5 5 6 15,5 
Austria 7,56 8,6 12,3 28,46 
Belgium 9 10,32 14,28 33,6 
Canada 5,46 7,38 11,88 24,72 
Denmark 10 8,52 12,24 30,76 
Finland 10 8,14 11 29,14 
France 10 8,7 12 30,7 
Germany 9,96 7,6 8,73 26,29 
Ireland 10,2 7,14 15,08 32,42 
Italy 7,59 4,338 12,75 24,678 
Japan 6,6 5,04 19 30,64 
Netherlands 11,31 10,32 15,54 37,17 
New Zealand 4,5 5 12 21,5 
Norway 13 11,04 14,42 38,46 
Sweden 10,44 6,8 13 30,24 
Switzerland 12 11,76 9 32,76 
UK 6,72 5,88 11,99 24,59 
USA 0 9,35 11,4 20,75 
8.2.2 Tables: Stratification 
Table 8.2.2.1 Stratification data (2000) 
Country Number 
of Pension 
Schemes 
Compensation 
to Gov. 
Employees (%) 
Means-
tested 
benefit 
systems 
Private 
pension 
expenditure 
(%) 
Private 
Health 
Expenditure 
(%) 
Average 
Benefit 
Universalism 
(%) 
Pension 
Benefit 
Equality 
(%) 
Australia 1 (0) 9,3 (2) 5 (4) 54 (4) 33,8 (4) 50 (0) 100 (4) 
Austria 7 (4) 11 (2) 0 (0) 1,4 (0) 24,4 (4) 85 (2) 57 (2) 
Belgium 5 (2) 11,5 (2) 0 (0) 13,3 (2) 25,4 (4) 95 (4) 59 (2) 
Canada 1 (0) 11,3 (2) 1 (2) 33,2 (4) 26,9 (4) 87 (4) 79 (2) 
Denmark 1 (0) 17,1 (4) 2 (2) 36,7 (4) 16,1 (2) 94 (4) 87 (4) 
Finland 8 (4) 13,1 (2) 1 (2) 3,8 (0) 28,7 (4) 91 (4) 51 (0) 
France 9 (4) 13,3 (2) 2 (2) 2,5 (0) 20,6 (2) 96 (4) 75 (2) 
Germany 5 (2) 8,3 (2) 1 (2) 1,1 (0) 20,4 (2) 92 (4) 25 (0) 
Ireland 1 (0) 8,4 (2) 0 (0) . (.) 24,9 (4) 100 (4) 89 (4) 
Italy 3 (2) 10,4 (2) 2 (2) 1,5 (0) 27,5 (4) 69 (2) 33 (0) 
Japan 8 (4) 6,43 (0) 0 (0) . (.) 19,2 (2) 81 (4) 44 (0) 
Netherlands 5 (2) 9,5 (2) 1 (2) 37,3 (4) 36,9 (4) 95 (4) 100 (4) 
New Zealand 1 (0) 8,5 (2) 6 (4) 30,4 (4) 22 (4) 65 (0) 100 (4) 
Norway 7 (4) 12,4 (2) 0 (0) 18,4 (4) 17,5 (2) 98 (4) 72 (2) 
Sweden 1 (0) 15,2 (4) 0 (0) 9,7 (0) 15,1 (2) 95 (4) 58 (2) 
Switzerland 2 (0) 7,6 (0) 0 (0) 41,7 (4) 44,6 (4) 99 (4) 83 (4) 
UK 1 (0) 9,6 (2) 0 (0) 35,2 (4) 21,2 (4) 93 (4) 52 (0) 
USA 5 (2) 9,5 (2) 1 (2) 34,6 (4) 57 (4) 62 (2) 60 (2) 
        
Mean 3,94 10,6906 0,94 22,1750 25,0118 85,94 67,97 
St.d. 2,94 2,73949 1,298 17,55682 7,73934 14,678 22,837 
Cutting 
points 
 8/13,4 0/2     
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Table 8.2.2.2 Stratification data (2010) 
Country Number 
of Pension 
Schemes 
Compensation 
to Gov. 
Employees (%) 
Means-
tested 
benefit 
systems 
Private 
pension 
expenditure 
(%) 
Private 
Health 
Expenditure 
(%) 
Average 
Benefit 
Universalism 
(%) 
Pension 
Benefit 
Equality 
(%) 
Australia 1 (0) 9,7 (2) 3 (4) 57 (4) 31,5 (4) 50 (0) 100 (4) 
Austria 7 (4) 9,7 (2) 1 (2) 1,5 (0) 23,8 (4) 84 (2) 60 (2) 
Belgium 5 (2) 12,5 (2) 0 (0) 24,5 (4) 24,4 (4) 96 (4) 69 (2) 
Canada 1 (0) 12,8 (2) 1 (2) 36,9 (4) 28,9 (4) 86 (4) 74 (2) 
Denmark 1 (0) 19 (4) 1 (2) 41,1 (4) 14,9 (2) 91 (4) 86 (4) 
Finland 6 (4) 14,5 (4) 2 (4) 6,3 (0) 25,5 (4) 91 (4) 40 (0) 
France 7 (4) 13,4 (2) 2 (4) 2,5 (0) 23 (4) 96 (4) 80 (2) 
Germany 6 (4) 7,8 (0) 0 (0) 2,4 (0) 23,2 (4) 85 (2) 29 (0) 
Ireland 1 (0) 12,2 (2) 0 (0) . (.) 30,5 (4) 107 (4) 95 (4) 
Italy 4 (2) 11,1 (2) 1 (2) 1,4 (0) 20,4 (2) 67 (2) 34 (0) 
Japan 3 (2) 6,1 (0) 0 (0) . (.) 19,5 (2) 104 (4) 44 (0) 
Netherlands 6 (4) 10,1 (2) 1 (2) 43,3 (4) 40,8 (4) 95 (4) 100 (4) 
New Zealand 1 (0) 10,3 (2) 6 (4) 29,3 (4) 16,8 (2) 67 (0) 101 (4) 
Norway 6 (4) 13,6 (4) 1 (2) 26,3 (4) 14,5 (2) 98 (4) 77 (2) 
Sweden 1 (0) 14,5 (4) 0 (0) 13,9 (2) 18,9 (2) 85 (2) 58 (2) 
Switzerland 2 (0) 7,8 (0) 0 (0) 45,8 (4) 34,7 (4) 99 (4) 86 (4) 
UK 1 (0) 11,4 (2) 0 (0) 33,9 (4) 16,8 (2) 92 (4) 60 (2) 
USA 5 (2) 10,9 (2) 1 (2) 29,7 (4) 51,8 (4) 60 (0) 54 (0) 
        
Mean 3,56 11,0824 0,82 24,7375 24,0059 86,36 69,29 
St.d. 2,431 2,41331 0,883 18,09622 7,32841 15,625 23,337 
Cutting 
points 
 8,7/13,5 0/1,7     
 
